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ABSTRACT 
As with the federal Constitution, state systems of separation of powers occasionally give rise to questions about 
the propriety of judicial resolution of certain issues.  The resulting political question doctrine under state 
constitutions, though the object of less attention than its federal counterpart, can claim its own jurisprudential 
niche.  Nor has the conception of political questions in state courts remained static.  This Article examines the 
political question doctrine under state constitutions in the wake of developments that have occurred over the past 
several decades.  It seeks to place this evolution in the context of the two frequently criticized bodies of 
jurisprudence at whose intersection it lies: the political question doctrine as construed by the United States 
Supreme Court and the general realm of state constitutional law.  Taken as a whole, state court decisions and 
pronouncements on the political question doctrine display a distinct duality.  Formal exposition of the doctrine 
remains largely derivative of the federal version.  At the same time, state courts apply the doctrine in ways that 
differ from Supreme Court rulings.  Such deviation can arise either from readings of state constitutional 
provisions independent of the Court’s interpretation of their federal counterpart, or from the construction of 
provisions that have no parallel in the United States Constitution.  In both instances, state courts make a 
judicial contribution to the oft-honored role of states as laboratories of democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While the United States Supreme Court recently continued its debate 
over whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are even justiciable,1 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court briskly dismissed this concern in holding the 
state’s legislative districting scheme to violate the state constitution’s 
guarantee of free and equal elections.2  This juxtaposition illustrates the 
 
1 In Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018), the Court remanded the case to give the plaintiffs the 
opportunity to prove concrete and particularized injuries requisite for standing to bring a challenge 
to Wisconsin’s gerrymandering scheme.  Id. at 1933–34.  Having confined its ruling to this 
question, the Court “express[ed] no view on the merits of the plaintiffs’ case.”  Id. at 1934.  
However, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), a plurality opinion of the Court had determined 
that the political question doctrine prevented the Court from hearing claims against political 
gerrymandering, because there were no judicially discernable and manageable standards for 
adjudicating such claims.  Id. at 281 (plurality opinion).  Justice Anthony Kennedy concurred in the 
judgment.  Id. at 270 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  However, Justice Kennedy left 
open the possibility that an appropriate standard could be developed in the future.  Id. at 311.  
 2 League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 824 (Pa. 2018) (“[I]t is beyond 
peradventure that it is the legislature, in the first instance, that is primarily charged with the task of 
reapportionment.  However, the Pennsylvania Constitution, statutory law, our Court’s decisions, 
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hybrid nature of state courts’ treatment of political question claims.  Like 
most state courts,3 Pennsylvania’s high court invoked federal precedent—
especially the Supreme Court’s iconic decision in Baker v. Carr4—in 
discussing its authority to rule on the claim.5  On the other hand, state 
courts are not required to slavishly adhere to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of parallel constitutional provisions.6  
In 1984 two articles appeared that addressed the political question 
doctrine under state constitutions.  One of these, in the course of a broader 
commentary on judicial review in state courts, pronounced the very idea a 
virtual nullity: “If a ‘political question doctrine’ exists in a state court, I 
have not heard of it.”7  As the author approvingly noted, state courts 
instead often bypassed the constitutional ruling sought by a party by 
disposing of the case through interpretation of ordinary law.8  By contrast, 
the other article took a more sanguine view of the putatively nonexistent 
doctrine.9  Surveying state courts’ discussion of political questions, the 
article discerned in these opinions a healthy illustration of the virtues of 
federalism.  By developing conceptions independent of both the federal 
version of the doctrine and each other’s, state courts promoted both 
experimentation and doctrinal pluralism.10 
In retrospect, both assessments may have missed the mark.  Over three 
decades later, state courts’ routine engagement with political question 
claims makes it difficult to dismiss the doctrine as a mere phantom.  At the 
same time, expectation that the doctrine would prove fertile ground for 
creative analysis overestimated the dynamism displayed by courts.  The 
result has been a middle ground in which state courts have grappled with 
application of the political question doctrine without, on the whole, having 
carved out the kind of distinctively nonfederal theory for which scholars 
have called11 in state constitutional discourse.  Unsurprisingly for a concept 
already cloudy in its original federal incarnation,12 and separately treated 
 
federal precedent, and case law from our sister states, all serve as a bedrock foundation on which 
stands the authority of the state judiciary to formulate a valid redistricting plan when necessary.”). 
 3 See infra Part III. 
 4 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 5 See League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 822–23. 
 6 See id. at 813 (“[This Court does not] utilize the same standard to adjudicate a claim of violation of 
the [Pennsylvania] Free and Equal Elections Clause and the federal Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 7 Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 189–90 (1984). 
 8 See id. at 190–92. 
 9 Nat Stern, The Political Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. REV. 405, 422 (1984). 
 10 See id. at 422–23. 
 11 See infra Section II.B. 
 12 See infra Section I.B. 
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by fifty jurisdictions, no uniform approach has emerged.13  Still, a review of 
the landscape of political question decisions can shed light on state courts’ 
perceptions of their proper role in the one universal feature of their various 
structures of government: separation of powers. 
This Article undertakes such an examination.  Its scope is confined to 
cases in which courts have expressly confronted assertions that a claim 
should be rejected because it presents a political question.  Thus, it does not 
encompass denials of standing that may effectively bar any suit from being 
brought under the constitutional provision in question.14  Nor does it 
include instances in which wholesale judicial deference to legislation under 
constitutional attack might be criticized as abdication of judicial duty.15  
Parts I and II describe the elusive nature of two areas of law—respectively, 
the Supreme Court’s political question doctrine and state constitutional 
law—that intersect to form this Article’s subject.  Part III then examines the 
extent to which federal jurisprudence has dominated state courts’ 
articulation of the essence of political questions.  Using state education 
clauses as an exemplar, Part IV reviews ways that state courts construe 
positive mandates embedded in their constitutions.  This part includes 
reflection on the broader problem of “self-executing” provisions in state 
constitutions.  Part V explores the marked diffidence generally displayed by 
state courts when asked to oversee internal processes of coordinate 
 
 13 Widespread reliance on the United States Supreme Court’s formulation of political questions in 
Baker, however, might be thought to come close.  See infra Part III. 
 14 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974) (denying 
standing to plaintiffs as taxpayers or citizens in suit challenging membership of Congresspersons 
in Armed Forces Reserves as violating the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST., 
art. I, § 6, cl. 2);  United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167–68, 170 (1974) (rejecting 
taxpayer standing in an action under the Statement and Account Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, 
cl. 7, to compel publication of receipts and expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency); see 
also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 271 (1988) (indicating that 
Court’s opinion in Schlesinger is open to interpretation that plaintiffs’ claim amounted to political 
question); Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 59 
(2009) (asserting that Court’s ruling in Richardson effectively treated claims under the Constitution's 
Statement and Account Clause as raising a political question). 
 15 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (rejecting a Tenth 
Amendment challenge to the application of federal Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees 
involved in integral operations of traditional governmental functions on the ground that the 
Constitution’s protection of states from federal overreaching under the Commerce Clause resided 
in “the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the 
objects of federal authority”).  But see id. at 567 n.12  (Powell, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of 
“abdicat[ing] responsibility for assessing the constitutionality of challenged action”); Mark 
Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 49, 60–61 (1989) (supporting 
Justice Powell’s dissent in Garcia by arguing that congressional consideration of the states is 
“relatively sporadic”). 
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branches of government.  Finally, Part VI discusses the ultimate 
convergence of state and federal jurisprudence illustrated (somewhat 
paradoxically) by courts’ application of the political question doctrine: 
judicial supremacy. 
I.  THE ELUSIVE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
The political question doctrine under state constitutional law falls at the 
confluence of two legal categories under siege.  Though the Supreme Court 
has promulgated a widely adopted standard for identifying political 
questions, commentators have attacked the Court’s approach as muddled 
and even incoherent.  Meanwhile, state constitutionalism has suffered 
perhaps even more withering criticism, as scholars lament the gap between 
the potential for a distinctive discourse and their sense that courts have 
squandered it.  A brief review of the Court’s treatment of the political 
question doctrine provides a baseline for the examination that follows of 
the—largely failed—movement to develop independent state versions of 
such doctrines. 
A.  A Short History 
At first blush, the federal political question doctrine seems 
straightforward enough.  Under its conventional formulation, certain 
constitutional provisions may be construed and applied only through the 
political process.16  Interpretation of such provisions is removed from the 
ordinary purview of judicial resolution because they raise “controversies 
which revolve around policy choices and value determinations 
constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the 
confines of the Executive Branch.”17  On the surface, then, the idea of 
political questions appears to take its place alongside such other established 
doctrines of nonjusticiability as standing, advisory opinions, ripeness, and 
 
 16 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 99–105 (1987). 
 17 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986); see also Helen Hershkoff, 
State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1862 
(2001) (“The political question doctrine . . . remits entire areas of public life to Congress and the 
President, on the grounds that the Constitution assigns responsibility for these areas to the other 
branches, or that their resolution will involve discretionary, polycentric decisions that lack discrete 
criteria for adjudication and thus are better handled by the more democratic branches.” 
(footnotes omitted) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–26 (1962); then citing Fritz W. 
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966)). 
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mootness.18  In practice, however, the conception, validity, and even 
existence of the doctrine have come under critical scrutiny.19  Thus, no 
description can provide a definitive account of the doctrine.  Still, the 
doctrine’s evolution in Supreme Court jurisprudence forms a discernible if 
not cohesive picture. 
1.  The Doctrine Before Baker 
While few would dispute that the modern federal political question 
doctrine was established in Baker v. Carr,20 the standard announced there did 
not emerge from a vacuum.  Indeed, the idea of nonjusticiable issues is 
thought to trace its lineage back to Marbury v. Madison.21  Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury is famed, of course, for reserving to the 
judiciary “the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.”22  He also, however, acknowledged limitations on this power: 
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, 
not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in 
which they have a discretion.  Questions, in their nature political, or which 
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be 
made in this court.23 
Though admittedly dicta, and open to varying interpretation, this passage 
planted the idea of judicial abstention from constitutional issues assigned 
under our system to the political process. 
Implementation of this concept occurred fitfully in the years before 
Baker.24  Perhaps the most direct antecedent of Baker’s understanding of 
political questions is Luther v. Borden.25  There, the Court ruled that issues 
arising under Article IV, Section 4, which provides that “[t]he United States 
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
 
 18 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968). 
 19 See infra Section I.B.2. 
 20 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 21 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 22 Id. at 177. 
 23 Id. at 170 (dictum). 
 24 For the view that the conception of political questions articulated in Baker represented a departure 
from the term’s meaning in Court rulings of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, see 
generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1908 (2015).  Professor Grove asserts that the traditional version of the doctrine during that 
period signified wholesale judicial deference to the political branches in their determinations of 
certain factual issues arising in cases.  See id. at 1915–39. 
 25 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).  Luther is discussed at length in the Court’s opinion in Baker.  Baker, 369 
U.S. at 218–23 (1962). 
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Government,”26 are reserved for resolution by Congress.27  Disposition on 
the merits of the suit in Luther would have entailed judicial determination of 
which of two rival factions represented the legitimate government of Rhode 
Island.  Instead, the Court determined that only Congress had authority to 
designate “what government is the established one in a State”28 and to 
choose how to effectuate that decision.29  Because the subject was “political 
in its nature,” the Guarantee Clause “placed . . . [it] in the hands of” 
Congress.30 
Subsequent decisions reaffirmed the nonjusticiability of the Guarantee 
Clause in the face of colorable arguments that a state government did not 
qualify as “Republican.”  Most notably, the Court in Pacific States Telegraph 
& Telephone Co. v. Oregon31 rejected a Guarantee Clause challenge to 
Oregon’s initiative system.32  Oregon voters had used this mechanism to 
enact a law taxing telephone and telegraph companies.33  Pacific States 
contended that passage of laws by direct popular vote rather than by 
elected legislatures did not conform to the model of republican government 
guaranteed by Article IV.34  In sweeping language, the Court proclaimed 
that the question raised by the plaintiff had been “definitely determined to 
be political and governmental, and embraced within the scope of the 
powers conferred upon Congress, and not therefore within the reach of 
judicial power.”35 
One other forerunner of the doctrine that crystallized in Baker36 was the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Coleman v. Miller.37  The case involved a 
challenge to the Kansas legislature’s ratification of a proposed 
 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 27 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42–47. 
 28 Id. at 42.  
 29 Id. at 43. 
 30 Id. at 42. 
 31 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
 32 The Court also rejected a challenge based on the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 137–40. 
 33 Id. at 135. 
 34 Id. at 137–38. 
 35 Id. at 135, 151; see also Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (rejecting 
the Guarantee Clause claim as nonjusticiable); Cochran v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 
374 (1930); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917). 
 36 The examples provided here are not meant to be exhaustive.  See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather 
Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (treating as a political question the decision to recognize a foreign 
sovereign and declaring that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is 
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative—‘the political’—departments of 
the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is 
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision”). 
 37 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
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constitutional amendment pursuant to Article V.38  According to the 
plaintiffs, the proposed amendment had already lost its vitality because 
Kansas had failed to act within a “reasonable time” after Congress had 
submitted it to the states.39  The Court neither endorsed nor rejected this 
contention.  Instead, the Court refrained from deciding the case altogether.  
In the Court’s eyes, the decision would be based on social, economic, and 
other nonjudicial considerations which Congress was in far better position 
to assess.40  Such factors rendered the issue “political and not justiciable.”41  
Accordingly, the determination of a reasonable time for the pendency of a 
proposed amendment “lies within the congressional province.”42 
2.  Baker’s Totemic Standard and Its Aftermath 
Somewhat ironically, the classic articulation of the political question 
doctrine appeared in a case in which the Court found that a political 
question was not present.  In Baker v. Carr,43 voters from populous counties 
underrepresented in Tennessee’s malapportioned legislature challenged the 
depreciation of their votes as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.44 
Before the Court could reach the merits of the claim, the Court had to 
confront the contention that the claim was nonjusticiable as a political 
question.  As a threshold matter, the Court dispelled the notion that the 
political nature of the controversy inherently rendered the issue a political 
question in the constitutional sense.  Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan 
dismissed this reasoning as “little more than a play upon words.”45  He then 
 
 38 U.S. CONST. art. V (stating that a proposed constitutional amendment must be “ratified by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of [or “Conventions in”] the several States” to become valid). 
 39 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 436 (1939).  The petitioners had also pointed to the amendment’s 
rejection by twenty-six states as grounds for ruling the amendment defunct.  Id. at 436. 
 40 See id. at 453–54. 
 41 Id. at 454. 
 42 Id.  Four concurring Justices, speaking through Justice Black, took a more sweeping view of the 
breadth of Congress’s authority and the narrowness of the Court’s.  Rather than confining his 
opinion to the question of a reasonable time for ratification, Justice Black recognized Congress’s 
plenary power over every facet of the amendment process.  Id. at 459 (Black, J., concurring) 
(“Since Congress has sole and complete control over the amending process, subject to no judicial 
review, the views of any court upon this process cannot be binding upon Congress . . . .”). 
 43 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 44 Id. at 187–88. 
 45 Id. at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 
(1927)); accord INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942–43 (1983) (“[T]he presence of constitutional 
issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political question 
doctrine.”); see also 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
JURISDICTION § 3534.1 (3d ed. 2018) (“Courts cannot avoid the responsibility of resolving a 
dispute between Congress and the Executive as to the constitutionality of a statute merely because 
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presented his endlessly quoted description of “prominent” indicia of 
political questions:  
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.46 
Finding standards under the Equal Protection Clause “well developed and 
familiar,” the Court ruled that the suit against Tennessee’s 
malapportionment suit could proceed.47 
In over a half-century of applying Baker’s standard, the Court has found 
its review of official action barred by the presence of a political question on 
only a few occasions.  In Gilligan v. Morgan,48 the Court dismissed a suit 
arising from the killing of four students by the Ohio National Guard at 
Kent State University.49  The plaintiffs had sought an injunction restraining 
Ohio’s governor from prematurely ordering the National Guard to duty in 
the future and requested that the district court “assume and exercise a 
continuing judicial surveillance over the Guard to assure compliance with 
whatever training and operations procedures may be approved by that 
court.”50  For the Court, the judicial intervention sought flew in the face of 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to a coordinate 
branch.  The Constitution assigned to Congress “the responsibility for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia (now the National 
Guard).”51  Moreover, as the Court suggested—and Justice Blackmun 
spelled out in his concurrence—the Court lacked judicially manageable 
standards for the oversight of military training and command that the 
requested relief would entail.52 
 
the issues have political implications.”). 
 46 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1969). 
 47 Id. at 226, 237.  The Court ultimately held in a later case that legislative seats must be allocated 
on the basis of population to the extent practicable.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
 48 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 49 Id. at 12. 
 50 Id. at 6. 
 51 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16). 
 52 Id. at 8 (“It would be inappropriate for a district judge to undertake this responsibility [of 
evaluating military procedures and policies] in the unlikely event that he possessed requisite 
technical competence to do so.”); id. at 14 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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Two decades later, the Court invoked a broader swathe of  Baker’s 
reasoning in ruling that a political question was presented in Nixon v. United 
States.53  Judge Nixon had challenged his removal through impeachment 
proceedings on the ground that the Senate had appointed a committee to 
gather evidence to report to the full body.54  According to Nixon, the 
Senate rule authorizing this procedure fell outside the Senate’s 
constitutional authority to “try” impeachments55 because it forbade the 
whole Senate from participating in the committee’s hearings.56  The 
Court’s analysis first explained why the impeachment provision amounted 
to a textually demonstrable commitment to the Senate of plenary authority 
to devise proceedings for impeached officials.  Most importantly, the 
conferral on the Senate of “sole” power to try impeachments signaled the 
exclusion of the judiciary from any part of the process.57  As to Nixon’s 
contention that he had not been properly tried as envisioned by the 
Constitution, the Court found that the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to 
the word “try” left it without a judicially manageable standard by which to 
review the Senate’s methodology.58  Still further, the Court cited Baker to 
support its conclusion that “the lack of finality and the difficulty of 
fashioning relief” militated against judicial resolution of Nixon’s claim.59 
Judicial review of a Senate verdict against the President, especially, would 
be fraught with dangers to the nation’s governance and political life.60 
Reluctance to intrude upon foreign policy entered into a four-Justice 
plurality’s conclusion that a political question was presented in Goldwater v. 
Carter.61  The plaintiffs, members of the Senate, had challenged President 
Carter’s abrogation of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan (the Republic 
of China) without approval by the Senate.62  Asserting the availability of 
judicially discoverable standards to resolve the issue, Justice Powell 
protested that the Court need only “apply normal principles of 
 
 53 506 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993). 
 54 Id. at 228.  
 55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”). 
 56 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. 
 57 See id. at 229. 
 58 Id. at 229–30.  The Court viewed the lack of judicially discoverable standards as related in this 
instance to the textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch, with the former 
bolstering the determination of the latter.  Id. at 228–29. 
 59 Id. at 236 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)). 
 60 See id. (considering the negative effects judicial review of a Senate verdict would have on the 
legitimacy of an impeached president’s successor, and what kind of relief would be available for a 
convicted official). 
 61 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). 
 62 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 700–01 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
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interpretation” to the pertinent constitutional provisions.63  Writing for the 
plurality, however, Justice Rehnquist found decisive the issue’s implication 
of “the authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign 
relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized 
to negate the action of the President.”64  In addition, Justice Rehnquist 
analogized the case to Coleman v. Miller,65 where the Court had refrained 
from ruling on the question of what constitutes a reasonable amount of 
time for a constitutional amendment to be ratified after its submission to 
the states.  As with proposed amendments, the Constitution prescribed only 
the procedure for ratifying treaties; in both cases the Constitution was silent 
on the means of termination.66 
3.  A Narrow Scope in Practice 
Ultimately, these isolated recognitions of political questions have been 
eclipsed by numerous instances of rejection of this defense.  It is probably 
inaccurate to speak of the decline of the political question doctrine.  Rather, 
as the holding in Baker itself intimated, the doctrine did not reflect a strong 
policy of judicial self-abnegation to begin with.  
Two cases, Powell v. McCormack67 and Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton,68 
particularly illustrate the Court’s inclination to sweep aside attempts to 
avoid judicial scrutiny through the political question defense.  In Powell, the 
House of Representatives had refused to seat Adam Clayton Powell after 
his election because of his alleged misuse of public funds and false report to 
 
 63 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 999 (Powell, J., concurring); see Edwin B. Firmage, The War Powers and the 
Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 65, 100 (1977) (“The national government is not 
speaking with one voice and may be able to do so only after judicial determination of 
constitutional competence.”).  Justice Powell would have dismissed the complaint for lack of 
ripeness.  Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 64 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 65 307 U.S. 433 (1939).  Coleman v. Miller is discussed in this Article.  See supra notes 37–42 and 
accompanying text. 
 66 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002–03 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004), a different four-Justice plurality argued that claims of political gerrymandering under the 
Equal Protection Clause should be treated as nonjusticiable political questions.  Id. at 305–06 
(plurality opinion).  Justice Kennedy, while supporting the decision not to recognize such claims at 
that time, “would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale 
were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.”  Id. 
at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The Supreme Court ruled on this issue in its 2017–18 term.  See 
generally Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 67 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
 68 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
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a House committee.69  On its face, the provision in Article I that “[e]ach 
House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own Members”70 
appeared to block judicial review of Powell’s challenge to his exclusion.  
Rejecting this interpretation, the Court held that the House’s discretion was 
confined to judging whether members met the age, citizenship, and 
residency requirements71 expressly set forth by the Constitution.72  
Zivotofsky, in turn, involved a delicate issue of foreign policy.  Relying on a 
federal statute authorizing Americans born in Jerusalem to have “Israel” 
named the place of birth on their passports, Zivotofsky challenged the State 
Department’s refusal to do so pursuant to its longstanding policy of 
neutrality on the political status of Jerusalem.73  The Secretary of State 
argued that the issue of whether Jerusalem-born Americans can elect to 
have Israel listed as their place of birth on their passport presented a 
political question, because the Constitution contained a “textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment” to the President of exclusive 
power to recognize foreign sovereigns.74  For the Court, however, the case 
involved a straightforward, if potentially complex, exercise in determining 
the constitutionality of a statute.75 
In other instances, the Court has not been long detained by parties’ 
assertions of political questions before proceeding to the merits.  In United 
States Department of Commerce v. Montana,76 for example, Montana voters and 
representatives challenged the constitutionality of the method by which 
congressional seats were allocated.77  The Court devoted only a few 
paragraphs to rebutting the government’s contention that Congress’s 
selection of apportionment methods was immune from judicial review78 on 
its way to delivering a ruling on the merits.  In INS v. Chadha,79 too, the 
Court rather summarily disposed of the argument that the case involved a 
nonjusticiable political question.80  Chadha had challenged a statutory 
 
 69 Powell, 395 U.S. at 489–93. 
 70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 72 Powell, 395 U.S. at 548. 
 73 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 189, 191–93 (2012). 
 74 Id. at 197 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 
U.S. 224, 228 (1993). 
 75 See id. at 197, 201.  The Court remanded the case to the lower courts to consider the merits.  Id. at 
201–02. 
 76 503 U.S. 442 (1992). 
 77 Id. at 446. 
 78 See id. at 456–59. 
 79 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 80  Id. at 941. 
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provision authorizing a house of Congress to override the Attorney 
General’s decision to suspend Chadha’s deportation.81  The Court found 
unpersuasive the argument82 that Congress’s plenary authority under the 
Naturalization Clause83 and the Necessary and Proper Clause84 shielded 
this legislative veto from judicial inspection.  After reciting Baker’s factors, 
the Court simply noted that determination of laws’ constitutionality was 
committed to the courts, that the Constitution itself provided discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving the issue at hand, and that the 
Court’s ruling would avert “‘multifarious pronouncements’” on the 
question.85  In additional cases as well, the Court has not been deterred by 
doubts over justiciability when confronted with assertions of unfettered 
congressional power.86 
B.  Rationales and Critiques 
While Baker’s indicia supply discrete means of identifying political 
questions, the doctrine’s foundation and significance have long been subject 
to debate.  Though the doctrine has been viewed in some quarters as 
arising from prudential considerations, it is now settled—at least within the 
Supreme Court—that the principle of separation of powers forms its 
principal underpinning.  This judicial consensus, however, has not spared 
the Court criticism that the doctrine fails as a coherent concept or that its 
underlying premise is fatally flawed. 
1.  Discretionary Versus Compulsory Basis 
Given the doctrine’s name, it is easy to conceive of political questions as 
the product of discretionary deference to the political process arising from 
 
 81 Id. at 928. 
 82 See id. at 940–41. 
 83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 84 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 85 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 168, 217 (1962)). 
 86 See, e.g., Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248–50 (1985) (rejecting 
contentions that resolution of the issue presented was textually committed to Congress and that 
circumstances created “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217)); see also United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 
385, 387, 396 (1990) (ruling that a claim alleging a federal statute was enacted in violation of 
Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, did not involve a political question).  The 
Munoz-Flores Court admittedly addressed the question of nonjusticiability at greater length than in 
other cases discussed here where the Court brushed aside arguments that a political question was 
present; the opinion’s firm insistence of the claim’s justiciability, however, was consistent with the 
confidence in judicial oversight reflected by more peremptory opinions.  See id. at 389–96. 
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judicial institutional concerns.  Indeed, prior to Baker, this perspective held 
considerable currency.87  Its most prominent exponent was Alexander M. 
Bickel, who viewed political questions as a potent device among the 
“[p]assive [v]irtues” that enabled courts to refrain from deciding some 
politically sensitive issues.88  For Bickel, prudential exercise of the doctrine 
helped to avoid risking depletion of the Court’s moral authority from 
entanglement in controversial matters the political branches were equipped 
to decide.89 
With Baker, however, the conception of political questions largely shed 
whatever prudential aura it had acquired.  While Bickel’s model obviously 
reflects concerns arising from the separation of powers, Justice Brennan 
more bluntly declared that “[t]he nonjusticiability of a political question is 
primarily a function of the separation of powers.”90  The implication that 
the Constitution compels rather than counsels judicial restraint in these 
instances is borne out by the dominant91 first two prongs of the Baker test.  If 
the Constitution manifestly commits an issue to another branch of 
government or the Court lacks judicial tools for resolving it, then the Court 
has no choice but to abstain.  Conversely, if no such obstacle stands in the 
way of judicial resolution, then the Court should proceed to the merits 
unhindered by prudential anxieties.92 
Still, if prudential conceptions of political questions have faded from 
formal doctrine, they have not disappeared altogether.  The Court has 
occasionally remarked that prudential considerations of limitations on the 
judiciary’s reach inform doctrines of nonjusticiability, including political 
questions.93  Moreover, scholars continue to discern strands of prudential 
 
 87 For an early commentary indicating a prudential understanding of political questions, see 
Maurice Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 344–45 (1924). 
 88 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 183, 187–88 (2d ed. 1986). 
 89 See id. at 184.  For an overview of the prudential model of political questions, see Rachel E. 
Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial 
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 253–63 (2002). 
 90 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); see also id. (“[T]he relationship between the judiciary and 
the coordinate branches of the Federal Government . . . gives rise to the ‘political question.’”). 
 91 See Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 46 
(2017) (“As concerns have risen that the courts have used the political question doctrine to 
abdicate their duty and avoid deciding hard cases, critics have emphasized the narrower, more 
constitutional aspects of the doctrine, specifically the first two Baker factors . . . .”). 
 92 See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (“Jurisdiction existing, . . . a federal 
court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide a case is ‘virtually unflagging.’” (quoting Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))). 
 93 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (stating that the political question doctrine is 
related in part to “constitutional and prudential limits” (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 
 
Oct. 2018] DON’T ANSWER THAT 167 
   
 
discretion in political question determinations regardless of any 
acknowledgement by the Court.94 
2.  Criticism 
More scathing than suggestions that there is more to the political 
question doctrine than meets the eye has been repeated insistence that 
there is—or should be—less.  On one side, the doctrine has been described 
as at best confusing95 and at worst hollow.96  Another, more fundamental 
critique is that the very notion of constitutional issues the Court will decline 
to decide is at odds with the duty of judicial review.97  
The contention that the political question doctrine lacks real substance 
is best associated with Louis Henkin, whose 1976 article famously asked: Is 
There a “Political Question” Doctrine?98  For Henkin, the answer was essentially 
no.  While Henkin did not deny the existence of political questions in an 
elemental sense,99 he thought the term’s use in judicial parlance a 
misleading label for a farrago of distinct propositions.100  The first two of 
 
1166, 1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring))).  
 94 See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 366 (3d ed. 2000) (“A 
prudential view of the Court’s role would treat the political question doctrine as a means to avoid 
passing on the merits of a question when reaching the merits would force the Court to 
compromise an important principle or would undermine the Court’s authority.”); John A. 
Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1014 (2002) (quoting BICKEL, supra note 88, at 184); Matthew Edwin 
Miller, Note, The Right Issue, the Wrong Branch: Arguments Against Adjudicating Climate Change Nuisance 
Claims, 109 MICH. L. REV. 257, 265–66 (2010) (describing cases that highlight the prudential 
aspect of the political question doctrine). 
 95 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 159 (7th ed. 2016) (“[T]he political 
question doctrine is confusing because of the Court’s failure to articulate useful criteria for 
deciding what subject matter presents a nonjusticiable political question.”); see also Ferejohn & 
Kramer, supra note 94, at 1012–15 (detailing the “erratic and inconsistent course” the Court has 
taken in its political question cases, which has resulted in a “very confusing doctrine”); Robert F. 
Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 643, 668 (1989) (“[T]he political question doctrine is largely incomprehensible to the Court 
and to the academy.”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1031, 1031 (1985) (explaining that the political question doctrine is “an enigma”). 
 96 See, e.g., Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 595, 614 (1987) (stating that “the doctrine is more easily demonstrated to be nonexistent 
than any other nonjusticiability doctrine”). 
 97  See infra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
 98 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). 
 99 See id. at 597 (“That there are political questions—issues to be resolved and decisions to be made 
by the political branches of government and not by the courts—is axiomatic in a system of 
constitutional government built on the separation of powers.”). 
 100 See id. at 622–63 (enumerating the five propositions believed to make up the “political question” 
doctrine); see also Nielsen v. State, No. CV93 0529695S, 1994 WL 684743, at *8 (Conn. Super. 
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Henkin’s five propositions assigned the label “political question doctrine” 
amount to judicial recognition of the constitutionality of a political branch’s 
act rather than refusal to review it.101  Other commentators, too, have 
suggested that the rejection of a claim as presenting a political question 
effectively functions as substantive acceptance of the challenged 
government conduct.102 
Some scholars acknowledge the existence of a discernible political 
question doctrine but dispute its legitimacy.  To them, the Court’s declining 
to rule on a constitutional issue otherwise properly before it is a self-inflicted 
blow to the power of judicial review.  Herbert Wechsler anticipated this 
position in 1959 when he asserted that the obligation of federal courts to 
address constitutional questions before them brooked no exceptions.103  
Later, Martin Redish mounted a trenchant attack on the idea that some 
constitutional issues lie beyond the reach of judicial review.104  For Redish, 
the political question doctrine rested on the self-defeating implication that 
“one or both of the political branches may continue conduct that could 
conceivably be found unconstitutional, without any examination or 
supervision by the judicial branch.”105  Others have echoed the belief that 
the political question doctrine represents an unwarranted abdication of the 
 
Ct. Nov. 18, 1994) (explaining that the determination of whether an issue is justiciable “depends 
on the particular amendment involved and what is necessary to effectuate it—it cannot be 
resolved by referring to general language extracted from different cases whose only connection is 
that they raise justiciability issues under the political question doctrine.”). 
 101 See Henkin, supra note 98, at 622 (“1. The courts are bound to accept decisions by the political 
branches within their constitutional authority.  2. The courts will not find limitations or prohibitions 
on the powers of the political branches where the Constitution does not prescribe any.”). 
 102 See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 887, 937 
(1994) (stating that when a case is dismissed because it presents a nonjusticiable political question, 
“the constitutionality or legality or validity of whatever it was that the plaintiff was challenging is 
now conclusively established because it has become unchallengeable in any court of law”); Yaron 
Z. Reich, Comment, United States v. AT&T: Judicially Supervised Negotiation and Political Questions, 
77 COLUM. L. REV. 466, 486 (1977) (“[J]udicial abstention on the basis of the political question 
doctrine usually leads to the same result as a ruling on the merits in favor of the political branch 
whose act is the subject of the challenge.”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable 
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1306 (2006) (“A holding that a 
category of cases is nonjusticiable in effect creates a judicially manageable standard, mandating 
dismissal, to guide future decisionmaking.”). 
 103 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1959) 
(“[T]he only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision is that the 
Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of government than 
the courts.”). 
 104 See Redish, supra note 95, at 1060. 
 105 Id.; see also id. (“The moral cost of such a result . . . far outweighs whatever benefits are thought to 
derive from the judicial abdication of the review function.”). 
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Court’s mandate.106 
II.  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ITS CRITICS 
The singular form of “state constitutional law” might be read to imply a 
monolithic body of doctrine that does not actually exist.  Unlike the federal 
regime, which is given unified meaning by the United States Supreme 
Court’s construction of a singular text, state constitutional law is produced 
by dozens of courts interpreting dozens of different documents.107  In 
addition, it is plausible to speak of a second, broader variation: the gap 
between the state constitutional law and the aspirations for it by scholars.  
Commentary on the subject has burgeoned, and its tone is often tinged with 
disappointment.  Much of this criticism has centered on the asserted failure 
of state supreme courts to develop coherent and distinctive constitutional 
theories that do more than merely mimic federal jurisprudence. 
A.  Salient Features of State Constitutions 
To acknowledge differences among state constitutions is not to say that 
they are devoid of common features.  Indeed, they share with each other as 
well as with the federal Constitution a basic template that makes them all 
recognizably members of the same legal family.  All share the familiar 
structure of separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches.108  Within this structure, all save one has a bicameral 
legislature,109 each has a governor who heads the executive branch,110 and 
 
 106 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or “Political Question”: A Response, 101 HARV. L. REV. 524, 
529–30 (1987) (“I see the political question doctrine as being at odds with our commitment to 
constitutionalism and limited government, to the rule of law monitored and enforced by judicial 
review.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 393, 469 (1996) (arguing that justiciability doctrines allow courts to not 
perform their “role of enforcing federal law”). 
 107 See G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 329, 332 (2003) (“[T]oday’s state constitutions were established at various points in the nation’s 
history, reflecting the political ideas reigning at those particular points in time, and that this in turn 
has affected the institutions that were created and the relationships established among them.”). 
 108 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1050 n.324 
(2006) (noting the commitment of states to separation of powers (citing Jim Rossi, Institutional 
Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1167, 1190–91 (1999))). 
 109 See Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits, 76 NEB. L. REV. 791, 799 (1997) 
(noting that Nebraska is the only state that does not have a two-house legislature). 
 110 See Norman R. Williams, Executive Review in the Fragmented Executive: State Constitutionalism and Same-
Sex Marriage, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 565, 570 (2006) (“[E]very state has adopted a tripartite system of 
government with a popularly elected governor as head of the executive branch.” (footnote 
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every judiciary has a high court that serves as the final arbiter of the 
interpretation of state law.111  Likewise, each state constitution contains 
provisions protecting basic individual liberties like free speech, equal 
protection, and due process.112  Moreover, while each body of 
constitutional law is unique, state supreme courts often consult federal 
courts’ interpretation when construing their own constitutional text.113 
In addition, a commonality of special importance is that state 
constitutions and constitutional traditions generally possess certain features 
that set them apart from the United States Constitution.  As a leading 
scholar of state constitutional law has observed, “[s]tate constitutions are not 
miniature versions of the federal Constitution, nor are they clones of it.”114  
Accordingly, state constitutions should be understood and interpreted in 
light of their specific history, design, and aims rather than through the prism 
of the federal Constitution.115  Deviations from the federal model, in both 
text and construction, can be grouped into several categories. 
1.  Durability 
The most apparent difference between a typical state constitution and 
the United States Constitution is sheer length.  In McCulloch v. Maryland,116 
Chief Justice Marshall explained the Court’s expansive construction of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in the nation’s sparse fundamental charter: 
 
 
omitted) (citing John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and 
Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205 (1993)). 
 111 See Benjamin C. Glassman, Making State Law in Federal Court, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 256 (2006) 
(“[T]he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940))). 
 112 See Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 332–33 
(2011) (explaining that state constitutions often contain the same individual liberty protections as 
the federal Constitution). 
 113 See Jim Rossi, Assessing the State of State Constitutionalism, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1151–52 (2011) 
(finding that state courts will consult and accept federal interpretations of constitutional provisions 
in some instances).  See generally Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008) 
(discussing the prevalence of the phenomenon of federal and state court interactions).  
 114 ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 20 (2009). 
 115 Id. at 36; see also James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 
VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 484 (1996) (arguing that states should seek to find their own solution to 
constitutional problems rather than rely on federal precedent); Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and 
Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs 
and Standards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1357 (2005) (asserting the benefits of state 
constitutionalism, including benefits to state governance and the ability for decisions to reflect 
unique state or local governmental issues). 
 116 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.  To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all 
future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the 
character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code.117 
By contrast, state constitutions contain a breadth of detail118 that makes 
them resemble the legal codes that Marshall thought alien to the character 
of the Constitution.  Such relative micromanagement is feasible because 
provisions of state constitutions are not entrenched “for ages to come.”  
Unlike the cumbersome process of amendment under the federal 
Constitution119—which was deliberately and successfully designed to thwart 
frequent change120—state constitutions tend to be relatively susceptible to 
amendment.121 
 
 
 117 Id. at 415; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . . To 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
 118 See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a State-Centered 
Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1641–42 (2010) (finding that the 
length and detail of state constitutions far outstrip the federal Constitution); Lawrence Schlam, 
State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional 
Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 276–77 (1994) (noting that state constitutions elaborate more 
on governmental functions than the federal Constitution); Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American 
Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2014) (“[S]tate constitutions 
are rather long and elaborate, and they include detailed policy choices.”). 
 119 See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 120 See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the 
Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 112 (1993) (explaining that a difficult 
amendment process promotes the durability of the federal Constitution); Marvin Krislov & Daniel 
M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 297 n.4 (2008) 
(describing the United States Constitution as “one of the most difficult constitutions in the world 
to amend”). 
 121 See Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 
839 (2011) (noting that state constitutions are “relatively easy to amend” as compared to the 
federal Constitution).  State constitutions—or more specifically state supreme courts’ 
interpretation of them—can be more readily “amended” in another sense as well.  Because state 
court judges lack the lifetime tenure of federal judges, they generally are subject to removal 
through electoral means that might be provoked by especially unpopular rulings.  See infra note 
159; see also Melissa S. May, Judicial Retention Elections After 2010, 46 IND. L. REV. 59, 59 (2013) 
(stating that elected judges may be evicted after an unpopular court decision); John L. Warren III, 
Holding the Bench Accountable: Judges Qua Representatives, 6 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 299, 311–19 (2014) 
(explaining that elected judges face a dilemma: to succumb to the pressure of public opinion and 
retain their seat, or to adhere to, at times unpopular, law and potentially lose their seat). 
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2.  Inherent Power 
A fundamental contrast between the federal and state constitutions 
flows from their divergent premises about legislative power.  As courts and 
commentators have long recognized, state legislatures possess plenary 
power except to the extent that they are constrained by their 
constitution.122  By contrast, the federal government’s lack of an inherent 
police power123 means that Congress must rely on express delegations of 
authority in the Constitution.  Thus, state constitutions largely focus on 
limiting otherwise untrammeled legislative power,124 while the Constitution 
enumerates specific legislative powers that Congress may exercise.125 
3.  Individual Rights 
It is almost inevitable that states will provide for more expansive 
individual rights than the United States Constitution protects.  With the 
bulk of liberties in the Bill of Rights applicable to states through 
incorporation,126 states can only build on this floor.  Many of them have 
 
 122 See, e.g., Yellow Dog Dev., LLC. v. Bibb Cty., 871 So. 2d 39, 42 (Ala. 2003) (finding that 
legislating local acts is unconstrained unless limited by the state or federal constitution); Giss v. 
Jordan, 309 P.2d 779, 783–84 (Ariz. 1957) (describing how the Arizona state legislature has 
plenary legislative power in Arizona unless restrained by constitutional provisions); Howard Jarvis 
Taxpayers Ass’n v. Padilla, 363 P.3d 628, 633 (Cal. 2016) (“[I]t is well established that the 
California Legislature possesses plenary legislative authority except as specifically limited by the 
California Constitution.”); Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 
728 (Mich. 2010) (stating that the Michigan state legislature has plenary legislative power in 
Michigan); FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DRAFTING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND 
AMENDMENTS 27 (2006) (“[S]tate government is a government of plenary powers, except as 
limited by the state and federal constitutions.”); W. F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 30 
POL. SCI. Q. 201, 205 (1915) (“‘[L]egislative power,’ granted in general terms, must be 
interpreted as conferring all governmental power, except so far as restricted by constitutional 
texts, i.e., that all such power inheres in the general grant.”); Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: 
Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1521, 1539 (2010) (“[T]he plenary nature of state legislative power is its central 
characteristic . . . .”); G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169 (1992) 
(asserting that state power is considered plenary). 
 123 See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (explaining that the federal government 
can only exercise power that was granted to it); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) 
(“The Constitution mandates this uncertainty by withholding from Congress a plenary police 
power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation.”). 
 124 See G. Alan Tarr, Popular Constitutionalism in State and Nation, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 279 (2016) 
(“[B]ecause state legislative power is plenary, constitution-makers have had to specify the limits 
imposed on that power, and they have done so in great detail.”). 
 125 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 126 See Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After McDonald v. Chicago, 88 NOTRE 
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done so in one or both of two ways.  First, primarily by judicial 
construction, they have enlarged through their state constitutions the 
contours of rights contained in the federal Constitution.  Second, their 
constitutions contain guarantees of affirmative rights absent from the 
generally prohibitory federal Bill of Rights. 
The impetus for interpreting state constitutional rights more broadly 
than similar federal liberties is often traced to Justice William Brennan’s 
1977 article urging this approach.127  While state supreme courts have 
displayed less independence than many scholars would prefer,128 they have 
recognized rights withheld by the Supreme Court in a significant number 
of instances.  For example, after the Court declared in Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co.129 that the First Amendment does not protect opinion as such,130 
a number of state courts located this protection in their own 
constitutions.131  Similarly, some courts have construed the search and 
seizure provisions of state constitutions less generously to the government 
than has the Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment.132  In some 
states, its supreme court has announced factors it will take into account in 
determining whether to interpret a state-guaranteed right more broadly 
 
DAME L. REV. 159, 159 (2012) (finding that all rights in the Bill of Rights have been incorporated 
to the states with the exception of those listed in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments). 
 127 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
489, 503–04 (1977) (applauding state court activism that grants greater protections to citizens 
than are applicable under the federal Bill of Rights). 
 128 See infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text. 
 129 497 U.S. 1 (1990).  
 130 See id. at 3, 18–19 (holding that there is no wholesale defamation exception for anything labeled as 
an “opinion”). 
 131 See, e.g., Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1278, 1280 (N.Y. 1991) (describing 
means for “separating actionable fact from protected opinion” and observing that the “protection 
afforded by the guarantees of free press and speech in the New York Constitution is often broader 
than the minimum required by the Federal Constitution” (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted)); Wampler v. Higgins, 752 N.E.2d 962, 965 (Ohio 2001) (“[R]egardless of the outcome 
in Milkovich, . . . [t]he Ohio Constitution provides a separate and independent guarantee of 
protection for opinion ancillary to freedom of the press.” (omission and second alteration in 
original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
 132 See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 712 (La. 1993) (explaining that the Louisiana 
Constitution protects individuals from “imminent actual stops” thus exceeding the Fourth 
Amendment protection that only protects individuals from “actual stop[s]”); State v. Woods, 866 
So. 2d 422, 425 (Miss. 2003) (finding the Mississippi Constitution’s Fourth Amendment 
counterpart provides greater protection to citizens than the federal Constitution); State v. Ferrier, 
960 P.2d 927, 932 (Wash. 1998) (requiring the government to show a “compelling need to act 
outside of our warrant requirement” when conducting a search into private dwellings under the 
Washington Constitution); see also In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 849 N.E.2d 
985, 995–96 (Ohio 2006) (construing the Ohio Constitution’s self-incrimination clause to provide 
greater protection than that afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution). 
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than its interpretation under the federal Constitution.133 
In addition to more generous judicial conceptions of parallel rights 
provisions, state constitutions also explicitly furnish grounds for recognition 
of rights not afforded by the federal Constitution.  It is a commonplace that 
the federal Constitution does not confer positive rights to benefits 
conducive—or even necessary—to minimal social welfare.134  The federal 
Constitution protects negative rights by proscriptions on government 
infringement of individual liberty, but it does not contain guarantees of 
access to housing, education, medical care, or sustenance.  Nor has the 
Court been willing to infer the existence of such rights.135  By contrast, 
express substantive rights and affirmative government obligations can 
frequently be found in state constitutions.136  Although judicial reticence in 
their enforcement can make such claims on state resources less robust than 
they might seem,137 they supply a textual foundation to courts inclined to 
effectuate guarantees of this nature. 
4.  Separation of Powers 
State constitutions are not bound to adhere to the allocation of power 
among the three branches of government established by the federal 
Constitution.138  Thus, states have not simply copied the system of co-equal 
 
 133 See, e.g., State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (explaining criteria for when 
the Washington State Constitution should be considered as extending broader rights than the 
United States Constitution).  For a critique of this “criteria approach,” see WILLIAMS, supra note 
114, at 169–77 (criticizing the idea that interpretations of the federal Constitution should be 
binding on interpretations of the states’ constitutions). 
 134 See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the Structural Constitutional Law Course, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1243 (2007) (acknowledging the general liberal scholarly consensus as 
holding that the Constitution provides no positive right to welfare). 
 135 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (“[T]he Due 
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid 
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may 
not deprive the individual.”); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (“We do not denigrate 
the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.  But the Constitution does not provide 
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.  We are unable to perceive in that document 
any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality . . . .”). 
 136 See generally Hershkoff, supra note 122 (inquiring whether state social and economic rights should 
exert influence on state court common law decision making); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough 
for Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. 
REV. 1459 (2010) (exploring the challenges of enforcing positive rights to welfare and other social 
assistance that exist in state constitutions). 
 137 See infra notes 281–92 and accompanying text. 
 138 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Prentis v. Atl. 
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908); Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State 
Separation of Powers Discourse,  4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 92 (1998) (“[U]nlike federal 
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and countervailing branches that Madison envisioned139 and the Court has 
sought to maintain.140  Exercising this latitude, states have adopted diverse 
approaches to delineating boundaries among the branches.141  Even at a 
basic categorical level, state separation of powers schemes largely resist 
generalization.  For example, the widespread presence in state constitutions 
of explicit separation of powers provisions,142 as well as pronouncements by 
some supreme courts,143 point to rigorous compartmentalization of the 
three branches.  Helen Hershkoff, however, has observed that in practice 
separation of powers at the state level “tends . . . toward blended functions 
that allow for complementary and overlapping activity by the different 
branches and foci of power.”144  Prominent among these transcending 
functions is judicial policymaking—a contradiction under federal theory—
through the common law.145  Similarly, many states have altered their 
 
individual rights precedent, federal separation of powers doctrine does not apply directly to the 
states.”). 
 139 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“[T]he powers 
properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely 
administered by either of the other departments.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra, at 318–22 
(James Madison) (describing how the three branches will serve as a check against each other). 
 140 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986) (“The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of 
the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive 
influence . . . of either of the others . . . is hardly open to serious question.  So much is implied in 
the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitution; and in the 
rule which recognizes their essential co-equality.” (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602, 629–30 (1935)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (“In designing the 
structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-
equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system . . . .”).  
 141 See WILLIAMS, supra note 114, at 238 (“State constitutional separation of powers questions . . . call 
for a state-specific form of analysis rather than one applying a more generalized, or universalist, 
American-constitutional separation of powers doctrine.”); Linde, supra note 7, at 188 (“[S]tate 
constitutions display a far greater (in fact, a bewildering) structural variety compared with that of 
the United States.”); Tarr supra note 107, at 329 (“The most cursory examination of state 
constitutions confirms how distinctive state constitutions and governments are.”). 
 142 See Tarr, supra note 107, at 337 (“Most states subsequently admitted to the Union likewise 
constitutionalized the separation of powers, and states have retained their separation-of-powers 
provisions . . . even when they have replaced their early constitutions.”). 
 143 See, e.g., State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So. 2d 1012, 1019–20 (Ala. 2006) (noting that the 
Alabama Constitution has an express separation-of-powers provision whereas the United States 
Constitution does not); Bates v. Dep’t of Behavioral & Developmental Servs., 863 A.2d 890, 911 
(Me. 2004) (“[T]he separation of governmental powers mandated by the Maine Constitution is 
much more rigorous than the same principle as applied to the federal government.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 799 (Me. 1982))); Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 
884, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (suggesting that state would “more aggressively enforce” 
separation of powers than the federal government would (quoting State v. Rhine 297 S.W.3d 301, 
315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Keller, P.J., concurring))). 
 144 Hershkoff, supra note 17, at 1905. 
 145 See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CALIF. 
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constitutions to empower the governor to exert a degree of control over 
spending that would amount to executive encroachment on legislative 
prerogative in the federal setting.146 
More fluid conceptions of boundaries between branches also contribute 
to wider access to state courts.147  Doctrines such as prohibitions on 
deciding moot cases and issuing advisory opinions often pose less 
formidable obstacles to state judiciaries than in Article III courts.148 
Another potential bar to justiciability, standing, also operates in many 
instances to allow suits that would be excluded by federal courts.  Broader 
standing at the state level is due in substantial part to the existence of rights 
under state constitutions that are absent from the United States 
Constitution.149  In addition, however, state constitutional law often permits 
standing on such bases as taxpayer or citizenship status150 that are typically 
inadequate in federal suits.151 
5.  Legislation 
Enactment of federal statutes must conform to the constitutionally 
prescribed process of bicameral passage by Congress and signature by the 
President or by a two-thirds vote of each house over the President’s veto.152 
The Supreme Court has refused to condone deviations from this “single, 
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”153  By contrast, 
 
L. REV. 613, 619–20 (1999) (describing judicial policymaking by reviewing administrative actions); 
see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (explaining that state-court 
judges have the power not only to make common law but also influence states’ constitutions). 
 146 See Tarr, supra note 107, at 338–39 (describing the line-item veto used in the vast majority of states). 
 147 See Usman, supra note 136, at 1518 (“Justiciability restrictions on the state level are less than those 
limiting federal courts.”). 
 148 See Hershkoff, supra note 17, at 1859–61 (discussing state court resolution of issues that federal 
courts deem moot); id. at 1844–52 (discussing state court administration of advisory opinions); see 
also G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE 
AND NATION 43 (1988) (arguing that state constitutions’ lack of language resembling Article III 
case or controversy requirement permits a greater range of judicial review). 
 149 See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Hershkoff, supra note 17, at 1852–59 (explaining some of the bases for standing in state courts, 
including one’s status as a citizen, taxpayer, or legislator). 
 151 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227–28 (1974) (holding 
that neither citizenship nor taxpayer status alone is sufficient to grant standing in federal court); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974) (requiring that an individual has more 
than a “generalized grievance” that is applicable to common members of the public). 
 152 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”); id. § 7, cl. 2 
(explaining how bills become law); id. § 7, cl. 3 (describing the presidential veto). 
 153 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
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most states have mechanisms that allow for the alternative of direct 
participatory democracy.  Lawmaking through initiative or referendum is 
widely available.154 
6.  Judicial Independence 
Insulation from political pressure is a hallmark of the federal 
judiciary.155  Life tenure156 for appointed157 judges was designed to 
safeguard fundamental principles from being trampled on by majoritarian 
passions.158  On the other hand, state judges by and large enjoy no such 
security; the selection or retention of the great majority of them is 
determined through elections.159  Numerous critics have charged that 
reliance on popular approval to gain or hold judicial office forms an 
inherent impediment to impartial judgment.160  Some commentators have 
marshaled evidence said to support a correlation between judicial behavior 
 
 154 K.K. DuVivier, The United States as a Democratic Ideal? International Lessons in Referendum Democracy, 79 
TEMP. L. REV. 821, 833 (2006). 
 155 See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First 
Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 306 (2003) (noting that “[t]he 
protection of judicial independence is . . . perhaps the foundational principle” of Article III); The 
Honorable R. David Proctor, An Overview of Judicial Independence from Impeachments to Court-Packing, 
47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (2017) (“The pillars of judicial independence are well-known, 
well-settled, and well-established in our federal Constitution.”). 
 156 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges shall hold office “during good Behaviour”). 
 157 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for appointment by president with advice and consent of the Senate). 
 158 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra  note 139, at 226 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the 
“independence of the judges” as “equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of 
individuals” from the ever-changing whims of the majority). 
 159 See Rachel Caufield, Judicial Elections: Today’s Trends and Tomorrow’s Forecast, 46 JUDGES’ J., Winter 
2007, at 6 (“Nationwide, thirty-nine states use some form of election to select or retain their 
judges.”).  See generally AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: 
APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2013), http://www.judicialselection.us/ 
uploads/documents/Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173077.pdf (showing the selection 
methods for judges in each state). 
 160 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1988 (1988) 
(“The paramount function of courts is to protect social minorities and individual rights.  But 
judges cannot be expected to perform this countermajoritarian function if their ability to keep 
their prestigious, highly sought after positions depends on popular approval of their rulings.”); 
Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 689, 694 (1995) (“When those charged with checking the majority are themselves 
answerable to, and thus influenced by, the majority, the question arises how individual and 
minority protection is secured.”); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 43, 51 (2003) (explaining the impact that the pressure of judicial elections has on judicial 
decision making); Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State 
Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997) 
(comparing the situation of a judge deciding controversial cases while facing reelection to “finding 
a crocodile in your bathtub” in that “it’s hard to think about much else while you’re shaving”). 
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and the prospect of reelection.161  In particular, data exists to support the 
inference that decision making by elected judges is responsive to campaign 
contributors and other constituencies.162  Whatever the exact force of these 
critiques, it is hard to dispute that federal judges are equipped to conduct 
their business with much more aloofness from popular opinion than the 
overwhelming majority of state judges. 
B.  Criticism of State Courts’ Constitutionalism 
It can fairly be said that state constitutional jurisprudence has come in 
for a great deal of scholarly scorn.  Much of this criticism has accused state 
courts of a blinkered perspective in construing their constitutions.  A 
particularly frequent refrain is that too often these courts simply decide in 
“lockstep” with federal court interpretations of comparable provisions of 
the United States Constitution rather than exercising independent 
judgment.163  Such condemnation is not universal; some commentators 
have cited extenuating circumstances for this phenomenon,164 while others 
have expressed approval of it.165  Still, the dominant sentiment among 
 
 161 See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of 
Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 793–94 (1995) (contrasting the rates 
of overriding jury recommendations of life without parole and imposing death penalty by judges 
subject to election and those not subject to election, with the latter showing a much greater 
incidence of overriding jury recommendations); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, 
Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004) 
(finding an increase in sentences handed down by judges as reelection approaches). 
 162 See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 649 (2009) 
(examining “whether judges bend their rulings to appeal to those who will be deciding whether they 
keep their jobs”); see also Lynne H. Rambo, High Court Pretense, Lower Court Candor: Judicial Impartiality 
After Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 13 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 441, 460–61 (2015) 
(explaining the data regarding increased spending on judicial election campaigns and the influence it 
has on judges); Chris W. Bonneau, A Survey of Empirical Evidence Concerning Judicial Elections, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, Mar. 2012, at 7, http://www.fed-soc.org/library/doclib/ 
20120719_Bonneau2012WP.pdf (“One area where the evidence is pretty clear is that elected judges 
are responsive to their constituencies when it comes time to make decisions on the bench.”). 
 163 See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 121–29 
(2014) (arguing for rejection of a lockstep approach to interpreting state constitutional right to 
vote); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court 
Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. Rev. 353, 402–04 (1984) (accusing state courts of abdicating 
judicial responsibility by mimicking United States Supreme Court constitutional interpretation). 
 164 See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent State 
Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 783, 818–31 (2011) (ascribing state courts’ lack of 
independent constitutional analysis primarily to strong path dependence). 
 165 See, e.g., James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional 
Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1061 (2003) (“Lockstep analysis . . . need not 
represent an absence of independent constitutional judgment; it can just as easily represent the 
outcome of a fully-informed exercise of independent state judicial judgment.”); Earl M. Maltz, 
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scholars of the area appears to be that “[t]here is no . . . reason for a 
lockstep jurisprudence in interpreting the structural provisions of state 
constitutions . . . [or] in interpreting their rights guarantees.”166 
On the contrary, they typically regard as misguided reliance on federal 
doctrine as a baseline for comparison.  As Hans Linde put it: 
[T]o ask when to diverge from federal doctrines is quite a different 
question from taking a principled view of the state’s constitution; in fact, 
this supplemental or interstitial approach prevents a coherent development 
of the state’s law. 
. . . .   
The right question is not whether a state’s guarantee is the same as or 
broader than its federal counterpart as interpreted by the Supreme Court.  
The right question is what the state’s guarantee means and how it applies 
to the case at hand.167  
Proposed methodologies for construing state constitutions vary.  Robert 
Williams, for example, has urged sensitivity to the distinctive text, history, 
and legal culture of the state constitution under review.168  Taking a 
consequentialist approach, Neal Devins describes how state supreme courts 
can assess the risk of backlash against their decisions by consulting unique 
features of their constitution, their state’s political norms, and other states’ 
experiences.169  More comprehensively, James Gardner has advanced a 
philosophy of interpreting state constitutions through the filter of states’ role 
in the federal system.170  Regardless of which of these or other theories171 
such scholars adopt, they are based on the premise that state supreme 
courts should forge constitutional analysis that is principled and 
autonomous rather than derivative. 
All too often, however, state constitutionalism—at least according to 
observers—has fallen far short of this ideal.  The title of Gardner’s The Failed 
Discourse of State Constitutionalism172 captures a harsh but hardly extreme 
version of this view, as does his thesis that contemporary state constitutional 
law is a “vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially 
 
Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 101–02 
(1988) (noting that lockstep analysis is consistent with state autonomy). 
 166 See, e.g., Tarr, supra note 107, at 331. 
 167 Linde, supra note 7, at 178–79. 
 168 See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 114. 
 169 See Devins, supra note 118, at 1674–91. 
 170 See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005). 
 171 See, e.g., Usman, supra note 136, at 1520–23 (arguing for an interpretation of state constitutions’ 
positive rights that is deferential but not as permissive as rational basis review). 
 172 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992). 
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unintelligible pronouncements.”173  A portrait of incoherence is also 
conveyed by another observer’s description of state constitutional law 
treatments of state-guaranteed individual rights as reflecting a “seemingly 
random heterogeneity.”174  Often considered parochial and lacking vision, 
state constitutions themselves have been blamed for contributing to the 
asserted inadequacies of state supreme courts’ decision making.175  In short, 
then, the examination of aspects of state constitutional law that follows takes 
place against the backdrop of much scholarly skepticism of the enterprise. 
III.  THE PERVASIVE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PRECEDENT ON STATE 
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
Critics of the lockstep approach to state constitutional law can make a 
forceful case that state supreme courts should carve out their own 
distinctive conceptions of political questions.  In practice, however, state 
courts still widely look to Baker v. Carr176 and other Supreme Court 
precedent in their articulation of formal doctrine.177  Even nominally 
independent state standards often carry echoes of Supreme Court 
rulings.178  In some instances where state court discussion of political 
questions diverges from the federal version, it is not clear that the court is 
applying a coherent idea of the doctrine.179 
A fundamental argument against wholesale transplantation of Supreme 
Court political question doctrine to state court decision making is that 
federal preoccupations are largely irrelevant to state concerns.  At a basic 
level, states’ often more permeable notions of separation among branches180 
 
 173 Id. at 763. 
 174 Patrick O. Gudridge, Random Heterogeneous Materials? The Robert Williams Book, News from Florida, the 
Stuff of State Constitutional Law Reconceived, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 931, 933 (2010); see also James W. 
Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?, 55 
MD. L. REV. 223, 244 (1996) (“[C]onstitutional criminal procedure has been transformed into a 
perplexing melange of disparate constitutional principles.”). 
 175 See James A. Gardner, What is a State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1025–26 
(1993) (“Typically, state constitutions do not seem to have resulted from reasoned deliberation on 
issues of self-governance, or to express the fundamental values or unique character of distinct 
polities.”); see also Linde, supra note 7, at 196 (“Most state constitutions are dusty stuff—too much 
detail, too much diversity, too much debris of old tempests in local teapots, too much 
preoccupation with offices, their composition and administration, and forever with money, 
money, money.  In short, no grand vision, no overarching theory . . . .”). 
 176 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  For a discussion of this case, see supra Section I.A.2. 
177 See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text.  
178  See infra notes 206–11 and accompanying text. 
179  See infra notes 218–26 and accompanying text. 
 180 See supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text. 
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alleviate concerns about judicial overreaching that drive federal doctrine.181  
Moreover, widespread state constitutional positive rights182 and common 
law rights create grounds for enforceability for which there are no federal 
constitutional counterparts.183  Similarly, the relatively detailed nature of 
state constitutions184 increases courts’ ability to discern in them principled 
and manageable standards.185  Finally, the practical finality of almost all 
Supreme Court constitutional rulings186 that inhibits judicial intervention in 
doubtful cases does not obtain among state supreme courts, whose 
interpretations can be overturned or undermined with comparative ease.187 
Consistent with such reasoning, state supreme courts have occasionally 
disavowed reliance on a federal template in determining whether an issue 
presents a political question. In the course of rejecting Baker v. Carr’s 
relevance to a claim before it, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that it 
had “cited or applied the Baker justiciability analysis only in rare 
circumstances.”188  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly 
asserted that it had “never explicitly incorporated the Federal doctrine [of 
political questions] into [its] State jurisprudence.”189  More bluntly, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court declared that “[t]he federal doctrine of 
nonjusticiable political question, as discussed and applied in Baker and later 
 
 181 See supra notes 88–89.  
 182 See supra Section II.A.3. 
 183 See Hershkoff, supra note 17, at 1863 (“[S]tate common law courts . . . tend to hear an array of 
questions that would be nonjusticiable under federal law.”); Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the 
Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1558 (1997) (“State 
courts regularly are called upon to enforce state constitutional obligations that . . . federal courts 
have declined to enforce.  Because these state constitutional rights impose affirmative obligations 
on the state, they differ from federal civil rights guarantees, in kind as well as in text.” (internal 
citations omitted)); see also Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 
248 (1972) (“[T]here are hardly any state analogues to the self-imposed constraints on 
justiciability, ‘political questions,’ and the like that occupy students of the Supreme Court.”). 
 184 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 185 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Political Question Doctrine in State Constitutional Law, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 
573, 585 (2013) (“[S]tate constitutional rules are comparatively more detailed; we can therefore 
expect courts to find in the documents more discernible and manageable standards.”).  
 186 See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 386, 414–15 (1983) (emphasizing how few constitutional amendments had the 
effect of overruling Supreme Court decisions); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why 
Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 693 (1996) (“[O]nly four 
[constitutional] amendments were enacted to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
 187 See Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 584 (noting the amenability of state constitutions to amendment, 
the incidence of legislative overruling, and the frequently wide “gap between a judicial 
interpretation and the implementation of the decision”). 
 188 Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 368 (Colo. 2009) (en banc). 
 189 Backman v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 441 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1982). 
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federal decisions, has no relevancy and application in state constitutional 
analysis.”190 
Such pronouncements, however, do not reflect the extent to which state 
courts have looked to United States Supreme Court jurisprudence in 
conceptualizing political questions.  Most notably, cases in which courts 
have recited Baker’s indicia in their entirety are legion.191  Some state high 
courts have repeatedly invoked these factors wholesale over a course of 
years, as if to signal that a recitation of Baker’s formulation is requisite to 
any valid analysis of a political question claim.192  Even this evidence 
understates the impact of Baker on state courts’ approaches; courts also 
often look to other portions of the Baker opinion besides its six-prong test to 
reach their conclusions.193  Moreover, the pervasiveness of Baker’s elements 
 
 190 State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325, 334 (Wyo. 2001).  See also State ex rel. Cooper v. 
Caperton, 470 S.E.2d 162, 170–71 (W. Va. 1996) (rejecting as inapplicable to amendment 
procedures under the West Virginia State’s Constitution a Supreme Court holding in Coleman v. 
Miller that the aspect of amendment to United States Constitution presented a political question). 
 191 Support for this characterization of the frequency of this approach can be found in a partial 
compilation of such cases from across the nation.  See, e.g., Meyer v. Lamm, 846 P.2d 862, 872 
(Colo. 1993) (en banc); Roger Sherman Liberty Ctr., Inc. v. Williams, 28 A.3d 1026, 1033–34 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2011); Ford v. Leithead-Todd, 384 P.3d 905, 911 (Haw. Ct. App. 2016); Cent. 
Austin Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 1 N.E.3d 976, 982–83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); 
Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 93–94 (Iowa 2014); Kan. Bldg. Indus. 
Workers Comp. Fund v. State, 359 P.3d 33, 43 (Kan. 2015); Philpot v. Haviland, 880 S.W.2d 
550, 553 (Ky. 1994); Sawyer v. Legislative Council, No. Civ.A. CV-04-97, 2005 WL 2723817, at 
*3–4 (Me. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2005); Jones v. Anne Arundel Cty., 69 A.3d 426, 433 (Md. 2013); 
Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017); Ghane v. Mid-S. Inst. Self 
Def. Shooting, Inc., 137 So. 3d 212, 217–18 (Miss. 2014); Progress Mo., Inc. v. Mo. Senate, 494 
S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Neb. Coal. Educ. Equity & Adequacy (Coal.) v. Heineman, 
731 N.W.2d 164, 177 (Neb. 2007); N. Lake Tahoe Fire Prot. Dist. v. Washoe Cty. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs, 310 P.3d 583, 587 (Nev. 2013); Mental Health Ass’n v. Corbett, 54 A.3d 100, 104 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2012); Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm’n, 214 S.W.3d 419, 435 (Tenn. 
2007); Freeman v. Am. K-9 Detection Servs., L.L.C., 494 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Tex. App. 2015); 
Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539, 541 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Turner v. Shumlin, 163 A.3d 
1173, 1180–81 (Vt. 2017); State v. Jensen, 681 N.W.2d 230, 244 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). 
 192 See, e.g., Office of the Governor v. Select Comm. of Inquiry, 858 A.2d 709, 747–48 (Conn. 2004); 
Seymour v. Region One Bd. of Educ., 803 A.2d 318, 323–24 (Conn. 2002); Nielsen v. State, 670 
A.2d 1288, 1291–92 (Conn. 1996); Pellegrino v. O’Neill, 480 A.2d 476, 482 (Conn. 1984); Salera 
v. Caldwell, 375 P.3d 188, 201 (Haw. 2016); Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 
286 (Haw. 2012); Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 737 P.2d 446, 455 (Haw. 
1987); William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 436 (Pa. 2017); Robinson 
Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 928 (Pa. 2013); Marrero ex rel. Tabalas v. Commonwealth, 
739 A.2d 110, 112 (Pa. 1999); Blackwell v. City of Philadelphia, 684 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. 1996). 
 193 See, e.g., State v. Tongass Conservation Soc’y, 931 P.2d 1016, 1018–19 (Alaska 1997) (addressing 
the relationship between the judiciary and coordinate branches of government highlighted as an 
essential element of a political question, as noted in Baker); Cent. Austin Neighborhood Ass’n, 1 N.E.3d at 
981–82 (highlighting the Supreme Court’s separation of powers analysis for determining 
justiciability in Baker); Kan. Bldg. Indus. Workers Comp. Fund, 359 P.3d at 42–43 (emphasizing Baker’s 
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should not be dismissed as unreflective or default references.  Numerous 
courts have explicitly announced their judgment that Baker’s standard 
warrants adoption by their state.194 
Nor is state courts’ reliance on Supreme Court political question 
jurisprudence confined to adoption and application of the Baker test.  
References to other Court expositions on the subject are sprinkled liberally 
through state court opinions as well.  These include Coleman v. Miller,195 
Powell v. McCormack,196 Nixon v. United States,197 and other cases in which the 
 
description of the political question doctrine as a “tool” that should not be used to promote 
disorder); Cooper v. Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98, 107, 128 (N.C. 2018) (highlighting the importance of 
courts exercising caution when delving into the realm of political settlements); Segars-Andrews v. 
Judicial Merit Selection Comm’n, 691 S.E.2d 453, 460 (S.C. 2010) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
definition of “political” in Baker and the role the definition plays in the political question analysis). 
 194 See, e.g., Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Alaska  2014) (“Drawing exact 
boundaries between the political and the justiciable is not possible, but we come as close as we 
can by applying the test announced . . . in Baker v. Carr.” (internal citations omitted)); Kan. Bldg. 
Indus. Workers Comp. Fund, 359 P.3d at 42 (“The seminal . . . case on the political question doctrine 
is Baker v. Carr . . . .”); Philpot, 880 S.W.2d at 553 (incorporating standards outlined in Baker v. Carr 
for “determining whether an issue is an appropriate subject for resolution by the courts or 
whether it is a ‘political question’ which the judiciary ought not adjudicate”); Jones, 69 A.3d at 433 
(“In Baker v. Carr . . . the Supreme Court outlined the essential aspects of a political 
question . . . .”); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy, 731 N.W.2d at 176 (“[W]e have not 
previously adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s justiciability tests under [Baker v. Carr], which we do 
now.”); N. Lake Tahoe Fire Prot. Dist., 310 P.3d at 585 (“To assist with [assessing whether the 
political question doctrine applies], we take this opportunity to adopt the factors set forth in Baker 
v. Carr . . . .”); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 928 (“[W]e customarily reference the several formulations 
by which the U.S. Supreme Court has described a ‘political question’ in Baker v. Carr . . . .”). 
 195 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939) (elaborating upon the political question doctrine beyond the 
discussion in Baker); see also Nielsen, 670 A.2d at 1291–92 (discussing further the Supreme Court’s 
political question reasoning in Coleman); Segars-Andrews, 691 S.E.2d at 460 (discussing the 
additional political question considerations presented in Coleman).  For a discussion of Coleman, see 
supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
 196 395 U.S. 486, 518–22 (1969) (analyzing additional important considerations under the political 
question doctrine); see also Select Comm. of Inquiry, 858 A.2d at 730–31 (proposing that Powell 
supports a political question or separation of powers analysis as the “ultimate expression of 
respect for equality among the branches . . . .”); Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 860 
(Ky. 2005) (drawing upon the reasoning in Powell to argue that, in conducting its political question 
analysis, the Court should refrain from interfering with discretion assigned to another branch in 
the Constitution); Jones, 69 A.3d at 433 (relying upon Powell in addition to Baker to conduct its 
political question analysis); Smigiel v. Franchot, 978 A.2d 687, 701 (Md. 2009) (using the 
reasoning in Powell to inform its separation of powers analysis); Cooper, 809 S.E.2d at 107 
(discussing Powell’s integration of the separation of powers analysis into the political question 
doctrine); Blackwell, 684 A.2d at 1071 (discussing the separation of powers mandate in Powell).  For 
a discussion of Powell, see supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 197 506 U.S. 224, 240–41 (1993) (White, J., concurring) (calling into question the Court’s role in 
judicial review given that there are nonjusticiable issues); see also Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. 
Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 215–16, 218 (Ala. 2005) (discussing the political 
question doctrine analysis in Nixon); State v. Maestas, 417 P.3d 774, 777, 781–82 (Ariz. 2018) 
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Court has addressed the nature of political questions.198  Even the Court’s 
early caution in Marbury199 against judicial intrusions into the political 
branches’ domain200 has been invoked from time to time.201 
Even some state high courts that have squarely staked out an 
independent doctrine of political questions have simultaneously drawn 
heavily from Supreme Court jurisprudence.  While insisting that it owed no 
deference to the United States Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme 
Court candidly acknowledged that “we look to the federal precedent for 
guidance in developing our own doctrine.”202  Similarly, though locating 
Colorado’s political question doctrine in the state’s Constitution, the 
Colorado Supreme Court determined that the indicia of a nonjusticiable 
political question “have been most clearly identified in Baker v. Carr.”203  
Along these lines, courts in New Hampshire and New Jersey have identified 
separation of powers provisions in the states’ constitutions as the source of 
their respective political question doctrines but then highlighted Baker’s 
formulation.204  In a variation of this theme, the Arizona Supreme Court 
cited the state Constitution’s muscular version of separation of powers as the 
 
(analyzing the non-justiciable standard in Nixon); Colo. Med. Soc’y. v. Hickenlooper, 353 P.3d 
396, 399 (Colo. App. 2012) (referencing the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolution discussed in Nixon as a bar to justiciability); Horton v. McLaughlin, 821 
A.2d 947, 949 (N.H. 2003) (quoting Nixon, 506 U.S. at 252–53).  For a discussion of Nixon, see 
supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text. 
 198 These cases include Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 276–78 (2004); U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. 
Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456–59 (1992); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 
229–30 (1986); and Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 8–11 (1973).  See, e.g., Magee v. Boyd, 175 So. 
3d 79, 105 (Ala. 2015) (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230); Forty-Seventh Legislature v. 
Napolitano, 143 P.3d 1023, 1026 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc) (citing Montana, 503 U.S. at 458); 
Hickenlooper, 353 P.3d at 399 (citing Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 9–10); Fletcher, 163 S.W.3d at 860 (citing 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276); Ghane v. Mid-S. Inst. of Self Def. Shooting, Inc., 137 So. 3d 212, 217 
(Miss. 2014) (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy, 731 
N.W.2d at 176 n.43 (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277); Bacon v. Lee, 549 S.E.2d 840, 854 (N.C. 2001) 
(citing Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230); S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. Judicial Merit Selection 
Comm’n, 632 S.E.2d 277, 278 (S.C. 2006) (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230).  
 199 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
 200 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 201 See, e.g., Ghane, 137 So. 3d at 217; Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
 202 Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 260 (Mont. 2005). 
 203 Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, 205 (Colo. 1991) (en banc). 
 204 See Baines v. N.H. Senate President, 876 A.2d 768, 774–75 (N.H. 2005) (relying on reasoning in 
Baker in addition to its local precedent); Loigman v. Trombadore, 550 A.2d 154, 157–58 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (drawing upon Baker’s reasoning  in conjunction with local precedent); 
see also Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 778 P.2d 757, 761 (Idaho 1989) (asserting that the issue of 
judicial abstention from a dispute was “more correctly viewed” under the Idaho State 
Constitution’s separation of powers provision but recognizing that “[i]n deciding such questions, 
we have relied upon the considerations described in Baker v. Carr”). 
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basis for its political question doctrine while noting that its conception of 
political questions flowed from the same reasoning as the Baker Court’s.205 
Another respect in which state courts have generally followed the 
Supreme Court’s lead is in eschewing a literal or expansive notion of 
“political” when determining whether an issue meets this description.  Baker 
was emphatic on this point: “The doctrine of which we treat is one of 
‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’  The courts cannot reject as 
‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action 
denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”206  In principle, 
state courts could adopt a broader view of nonjusticiability in which the 
sensitivity of judicial insertion into the political process could play a 
substantial role.  In practice, however, state courts have often invoked 
Baker’s articulation of the distinction between nonjusticiable issues and the 
mere presence of political elements in cases when dismissing challenges to 
politically charged suits.207  Drawing from another portion of the Baker 
opinion, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed that “the mere fact that 
[a] suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a 
 
 205 See Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168, 170–71 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc); cf. Alexander v. 
Houston, 744 S.E.2d 517, 519–20 (S.C. 2013) (quoting from both South Carolina Supreme Court 
precedent and Baker in determining whether a political question is presented); Neeley v. W. 
Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 779 (Tex. 2005) (assuming but 
declining to decide that Texas Constitution incorporates Baker’s test for political questions). 
 206 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 207 See e.g., Walleri v. City of Fairbanks, 964 P.2d 463, 467–68 (Alaska 1998) (adopting Baker’s 
prioritization of constitutional commitment of an issue to another branch over the political nature 
of an issue); Kaho‘ohanohano v. State, 162 P.3d 696, 729 (Haw. 2007) (adhering to the political 
question analysis as stated in Baker); Ford v. Leithead-Todd, 384 P.3d 905, 912–13 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 2016) (finding that a determination of whether an occupant of office was legally qualified to 
hold office did not present a political question); Kluk v. Lang, 531 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ill. 1988) 
(delineating limitations on how the presence of political elements preclude the Court’s 
adjudication); House Speaker v. Governor, 506 N.W.2d 190, 199 (Mich. 1993) (emphasizing that 
the mere presence of political components does not preclude judicial adjudication); Baines, 876 
A.2d at 774–75 (examining the types of political considerations that render an issue 
nonjusticiable); see also City of Derby v. Garofalo, No. CV085004821S, 2010 WL 1565520, at *4 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2010) (“This case may be connected to the political sphere, but does 
not raise political questions of the kind that would place the court in conflict with the primary 
authority of a coordinate branch of government.”); Kaho‘ohanohano, 162 P.3d at 729 (“[A]ll 
constitutional interpretations have political consequences.” (quoting Board of Educ. v. Waihee, 
768 P.2d  1279, 1285 (Haw. 1989))); Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 339 (Miss. 1987) 
(“That great constitutional and legal questions may become topics of political and even partisan 
controversy should never be employed by this Court as an excuse to duck its responsibility to 
adjudicate the legal and constitutional rights of the parties.”); State v. Chvala, 678 N.W.2d 880, 
896 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Baker’s test and concluding that a determination of whether a 
legislator violated a prohibition on campaigning activity during working hours did not present a 
political question). 
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political question.”208  Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court, resolving a 
dispute between the governor and legislature, quoted the United States 
Supreme Court’s observation in INS v. Chadha209 that “the presence of 
constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not 
automatically invoke the political question doctrine.”210  Of course it is 
possible for a constitutional political question to arise out of a political issue, 
but such rulings do not typically appear to conflate the two.211 
Echoes of the narrow scope of the federal political question concept can 
also be found in cases where a party invokes the doctrine outside the 
constitutional sphere.  In these instances, state courts tend to effectively 
dismiss out of hand assertions of nonjusticiability.  Thus, in a suit involving 
claims of trespass and negligence, the Iowa Supreme Court summarized 
precedent as establishing that “actions for damages are relatively immune 
to efforts to dismiss based upon the political question doctrine.”212  A 
Missouri court further brought into focus the line between justiciable and 
nonjusticiable questions when ruling on claims for damages against 
operators of a radiopharmaceutical processing plant that had allegedly 
caused the plaintiffs’ injuries: “The propriety of nuclear related activities is 
a political question properly committed to the legislative and executive 
branches of our government.  Nonetheless, individual tort recoveries 
stemming from those activities normally are not precluded by the political 
question doctrine.”213 
As the above-quoted passage suggests, state courts occasionally deviate 
from the specific confines of Baker’s formal conception of political questions.  
In that instance, the Missouri court seemed to blur if not collapse the ideas 
 
 208 Nielsen v. Kezer, 652 A.2d 1013, 1020 n.19 (Conn. 1995) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 209). 
 209 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. 
 210 Id. at 942–43; Brewer v. Burns, 213 P.3d 671, 675 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Chadha, 462 
U.S. at 942–43); see also Bysiewicz v. DiNardo, No. HHD–CV–10–6008194S, 2010 WL 1838604, 
at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 5, 2010) (refusing to characterize as posing a political question a 
suit by candidate for Attorney General seeking confirmation of her eligibility to serve in that 
office), rev’d on other grounds, 6 A.3d 726 (Conn. 2010); Jones v. Anne Arundel Cty., 69 A.3d 426, 
432–33 (Md. 2013) (“The existence of politics in a case, however, does not define whether a case 
involves a political question.” (emphasis added) (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942–43)). 
 211 See, e.g., Edgington v. City of Overland Park, 815 P.2d 1116, 1124 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing 
on political question grounds a challenge by a nominee to a City Council vacancy following the 
rejection of his nomination); see also Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088, 1097–99 (Alaska 
2014) (designating a minors’ claims that the state failed to fulfill its duty to take steps to employ the 
“best available science” to mitigate effects of climate change as nonjusticiable political question). 
 212 Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 93 (Iowa 2014). 
 213 Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 864 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (citation omitted) (citing 
McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464, 470 (10th Cir. 1983). 
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of wholesale abstention under the political question doctrine with 
deferential approval on the merits.  While it has been argued that the 
distinction between the two lacks substance,214 the formal doctrine assumes 
its existence.215  Thus, for example, there was some tension between the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s simultaneously dismissing a suit brought 
under the state’s education clause as presenting a political question and the 
court’s affirming that the challenged scheme did not “clearly, palpably, and 
plainly violate” this provision.216  In North Lake Tahoe Fire Protection District v. 
Washoe County Board of County Commissioners,217 the Nevada Supreme Court 
similarly cast its affirmation of the authority of county officials to undertake 
a certain action in terms of the language of political questions.218  Quite 
pointedly, a Washington court ruled that a challenge to a state statute 
presented a political question while pointing to both state and federal 
precedent endorsing the proposition that courts will defer to the legislature 
on the wisdom of legislation.219 
These departures from orthodox doctrine, however, appear to be more 
the product of imprecision than conscious defiance of that doctrine.  
Support for this inference can be found in cases where state courts apply 
political question analysis to statutory rather than constitutional 
interpretation.220  Courts in these instances do not announce an explicit 
break from the Supreme Court’s conception of political questions; indeed, 
these are often cases in which courts point to Baker as a guidepost.221  
 
 214 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 215 See Henkin, supra note 98, at 599 (“[I]n ‘pure theory’ a political question is one in which the courts 
forego their unique and paramount function of judicial review of constitutionality.”). 
 216 Marrero ex rel. Tabalas v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 112–13 (Pa. 1999) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
 217 310 P.3d 583 (Nev. 2013). 
 218 See id. at 588–90. 
 219 See Nw. Animal Rights Network v. State, 242 P.3d 891, 895–96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (noting the 
Washington courts will defer to the decision of the legislature regarding its legislation in order to 
remain consistent with the separation of powers).  
 220 See, e.g., Troutner v. Kempthorne, 128 P.3d 926, 931 (Idaho 2006) (discussing an alleged violation 
of statutory provisions governing eligibility for judicial council); Des Moines Register & Tribune 
Co. v. Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d 491, 503 (Iowa 1996) (rejecting suit seeking compliance with state’s 
open records law); N.Y. State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enf’t Emps. v. Cuomo, 475 N.E.2d 90, 93–
94 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that employees’ suit to enjoin the scheduled closing of a correctional 
facility threatened the separation of powers); People v. Ohrenstein, 549 N.Y.S.2d 962, 981 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1989) (per curiam) (dismissing the prosecution of legislative aides for violating a 
statutory restriction on participating in political campaigns); see also Blackwell v. City of 
Philadelphia, 660 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (acknowledging that the suit under 
review “is not based on any alleged constitutional deprivation”). 
 221 See, e.g., Des Moines Register, 542 N.W.2d at 495 (listing factors, discussed in Baker, that show the 
existence of a political question); Ohrenstein, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 971 (stating a political question is not 
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Rather, they seem to reflect a casual assumption that the political question 
doctrine encompasses a range of issues that raise considerations of 
separation of powers. 
IV.  EDUCATION, SPENDING, AND THE PROBLEM OF NON-SELF-
EXECUTING GUARANTEES 
Notwithstanding the debt owed to federal political question 
jurisprudence, state courts must carve out distinct ground when addressing 
the justiciability of provisions that have no parallel in the United States 
Constitution.  A salient example of this phenomenon is the guarantee of a 
sufficient public education found in many state constitutions.  Three 
principal overlapping grounds exist for dismissing suits to enforce such 
guarantees as presenting political questions.  First, the broad terms in which 
education clauses are typically framed222 raise doubts about the capacity of 
courts to translate them into concrete requirements in a principled way.  
Second, education clauses generally are not self-executing.  That is, in 
contrast to the usually automatic remedy for violation of negative rights 
such as freedom of speech223—invalidation of the offending law or action—
enforcement of positive rights entails policy formulation normally 
associated with the legislative and executive branches.  Third, redress for 
states’ breach of their duty under an education clause inevitably involves 
decisions about public finance.  All these features raise serious concerns 
about judicial overreach under the scheme of separation of powers from 
which the political question doctrine stems.  Nevertheless, judicial responses 
to such suits have been far from uniformly negative.  State court rulings 
have varied on the issue of justiciability—an example of the larger 
fragmentation that marks state constitutionalism.224  Whether this variety 
signifies a healthy vindication of states as laboratories of democracy225 or 
the conceptual incoherence that scholars allege226 is an open question. 
 
always easily defined); Blackwell, 660 A.2d at 172–73 (noting Baker’s discussion on whether a 
question is a political question). 
 222 See infra notes 231–34 and accompanying text. 
 223 The difference between negative and positive rights is discussed at supra notes 134–37 and 
accompanying text. 
 224 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 225 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
a state should be able to experiment with new social and economic policies). 
 226 See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
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A.  The Problem of Standards 
Suits under state constitutions seeking judicially ordered improvements 
in public education were largely sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez227 rejecting an equal 
protection challenge to disparities in funding among Texas school 
districts.228  Plaintiffs seized upon states’ provision for an adequate public 
education to argue that existing arrangements, especially in financing, 
failed to satisfy this guarantee.229  The commonly applied Baker test, 
however, offers several potential grounds for defeating such claims.  A court 
might view a constitutional legislative obligation to maintain a suitable 
system of education as representing a “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department.”230  Moreover, while the language of education clauses varies 
among states,231 they are all couched in terms general enough to raise the 
question of whether they supply to courts “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards”232 for effectuating this right.233  Nor is it difficult to 
 
 227 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (holding a Texas school-
financing system satisfies the Equal Protection Clause standard). 
 228 See Christine M. O’Neill, Note, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court Use of the Political Question 
Doctrine to Deny Access to Educational Adequacy Claims, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 545, 550–52 
(2009) (stating that similar strategies used in San Antonio Independent School District were used around 
the country in state education finance litigation). 
 229 For recent overviews of this subject, see, for example, William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The 
Promises and Pitfalls of the Next Generation of Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 
1901–23 (2017) (discussing the shift in educational finance reform litigation from equal protection 
litigation to equity litigation to adequacy litigation).  See Madeline Davis, Off the Constitutional Map: 
Breaking the Endless Cycle of School Finance Litigation, 2016 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 117, 119–40 (2016) 
(discussing plaintiffs’ success in bringing adequacy arguments in school finance litigation in New 
Hampshire); see also Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in 
Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L 83, 90–120 
(2010) (discussing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), McDuffy v. 
Secretary of the Executive Office of Eductation, 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993), and Rose v. Council for Better 
Education, 790 S.W. 186 (Ky. 1989), where plaintiffs found success using adequacy arguments in 
school finance litigation). 
 230 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 231 Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 777, 815–16 (1985) (categorizing four “basic groups” of state constitutional 
education provisions). 
 232 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 233 See Ratner, supra note 231, at 815–16 (after classifying four “basic groups” of state constitutional 
education programs, describing as “stronger and more specific” than the first two groups’ 
provisions a third group such as the requirement that the legislature “promote public schools and 
to adopt all means which they may deem necessary and proper to secure . . . the advantages . . . of 
education” and deeming exemplary of the fourth group’s “strongest commitment to education” 
the mandate that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the 
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imagine a court’s concluding that deciding whether a state’s education 
scheme violated its education clause would inevitably entail “an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”234 
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in  Nebraska Coalition for 
Educational Equity and Adequacy (Coalition) v. Heineman235 illustrates how a court 
can invoke such grounds to avoid assessing legislative compliance with an 
education mandate.  At issue was whether the state’s education funding 
system violated two provisions of the Nebraska Constitution: (1) “Religion, 
morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it 
shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws . . . to encourage 
schools and the means of instruction.”236 and (2) “The Legislature shall 
provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state of all 
persons between the ages of five and twenty-one years.”237  Dismissing the 
suit under the political question doctrine, the court first determined that 
since these duties were directed to the legislature, their discharge had been 
constitutionally committed to that branch of government.238  In the court’s 
eyes, this interpretation was bolstered by the conclusion that there existed 
“no qualitative, constitutional standards for public schools that this court 
could enforce,” other than the availability of free public education to all 
minors.239  As a corollary, the court approvingly quoted the Illinois 
Supreme Court: 
It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of 
quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the 
constitution in any meaningful sense.  Nor is education a subject within the 
judiciary’s field of expertise . . . .  Rather, the question of educational 
quality is inherently one of policy involving philosophical and practical 
considerations that call for the exercise of legislative and administrative 
discretion.240 
 
 
education of all children residing within its borders . . . .” (alterations in original) (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted)). 
 234 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  See generally Anthony Bilan, Note, The Runaway Wagon: How Past School 
Discrimination, Finance, and Adequacy Case Law Warrants a Political Question Approach to Education Reform 
Litigation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1225 (2016) (urging courts to take a political question approach 
to suits alleging educational inadequacy to avoid judicial intrusion into policy formulation). 
 235 731 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 2007). 
 236 Id. at 169 (omission in original) (quoting NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4). 
 237 Id. (quoting NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1). 
 238 See id. at 178 (noting that the Nebraska Constitution delegated responsibility to determine the 
methods and means to provide free instruction to the Legislature). 
 239 Id. at 179. 
 240 Id. at 181 (omission in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 
N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996)). 
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The constitutional provision to which the Illinois Supreme Court 
referred required the state to maintain a system of “high quality” 
education241—arguably a more plausible invitation to judicial scrutiny than 
the more generic provisions in Nebraska.  Echoing Baker, however, the 
Illinois court averred that the meaning of the term and its best mode of 
implementation “cannot be ascertained by any judicially discoverable or 
manageable standards.”242  Other state high courts, construing varying 
language in their education clauses, have likewise acted on the same 
impulse that the judiciary is neither assigned nor equipped to undertake the 
task of overseeing a state’s education system.  For example, Rhode Island’s 
constitution charged the legislature with the “duty . . . to adopt all means 
which it may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the 
advantages and opportunities of education and public library services.”243  
In basing their challenge to the state’s system for financing public education 
on this charge, the plaintiffs were ruled to have “asked the judicial branch 
to enforce policies for which there are no judicially manageable 
standards.”244  The Oklahoma Supreme Court similarly dismissed a suit 
alleging inadequate funding of public schools brought to enforce the 
legislature’s duty to “establish and maintain a system of free public 
schools.”245  Ruling the matter solely within the province of the legislature, 
the court deemed the suit to present a nonjusticiable political question.246  
In the same vein, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the legislature’s 
constitutional obligation to provide “for a general and uniform system” of 
public schools247 left to legislative discretion the standard of education to be 
achieved.248 
 
 
 241 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1183 (internal quotation marks). 
 242 Id. at 1191. 
 243 City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 49–50 (R.I. 1995) (quoting R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1). 
 244 Id. at 58. 
 245 Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058, 1064 (Okla. 2007) (quoting 
OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1). 
 246 Id. at 1065–66. 
 247 Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Ind. 2009) (quoting IND. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1). 
 248 Id. at 522; see also Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 539–40 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) 
(rejecting claim of inadequate education under constitutional provision similar to Indiana’s on the 
grounds that a determination of quality was committed to the legislature, a determination of the 
applicable standard would entail a policy determination inappropriate for the judiciary, and the 
court lacked discoverable and manageable standards for resolving claims).  For criticism of 
reliance on the political question doctrine to dismiss suits brought under state constitutional 
provisions, see Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic 
Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923, 958–60 (2011). 
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Nevertheless, most state courts confronted with claims under education 
clauses249 have not been daunted by the challenge of fashioning 
standards.250  For example, a number of high courts have found the 
concept of efficiency in education ascertainable enough to furnish a 
judicially enforceable touchstone.  Notably, the Texas Supreme Court in a 
suit over school financing weighed the justiciability of a legislative 
obligation to make “suitable provision” for an “efficient” system of public 
schools to ensure “[a] general diffusion of knowledge.”251  The court 
rejected the contention that these terms were so imprecise as to make them 
unsusceptible to judicial interpretation.252  For the Ohio Supreme Court, 
the provision at issue directed the legislature to maintain a “thorough and 
efficient” public school system.253  That court refused to “dodge our 
responsibility” by deeming the case to present a political question.254  
Facing an almost identically worded provision, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court rebutted at length the proposition that it was incapable of construing 
this constitutional mandate in a principled manner.255  In other instances, 
 
 249 This analysis does not address cases in which courts have found challenges to educational funding 
schemes justiciable under other state constitutional provisions.   See, e.g., Seymour v. Region One 
Bd. of Educ., 803 A.2d 318, 325 (Conn. 2002) (finding justiciable standards for determining equal 
protection and due process challenges to requirement that taxpayers contribute educational 
funding); Bd. of Educ. v. Waihee, 768 P.2d 1279, 1285 (Haw. 1989) (finding justiciable standards 
for determining whether state officials decisions on the state education budget alleged separation 
of powers violation). 
 250 Pursuant to the scope of this Article, the discussion below does not include state court decisions 
prior to 1985 that rule on the merits of various state constitutional claims involving education.  
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 947–48 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (ruling on state equal 
protection claim); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 163–66 (Ga. 1981) (addressing claims 
brought under guarantees of equal protection and “adequate education”); Thompson v. 
Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 652 (Idaho 1975) (involving suit based on guarantee of equal protection 
and requirement of “uniform system of public schools”); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 
458 A.2d 758, 770 (Md. 1983) (interpreting guarantees of equal protection and of “thorough and 
efficient system of free public schools” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 
v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 90–93 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (deciding scope of state duty to “make ample 
provision for the education of all resident children”); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. 
Va. 1979) (construing guarantees of equal protection and of “thorough and efficient system of free 
schools” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 251 Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tex. 2005) (quoting 
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1). 
 252 Id. at 776 (citing Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Tex. App. 1989), 
rev’d, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989)). 
 253 DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ohio 1997) (quoting OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2). 
 254 Id. at 737; see id. at 741 (“This court has construed the words ‘thorough and efficient’ in light of 
the constitutional debates and history surrounding them.”). 
 255 See William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 457 (Pa. 2017) (stating a court is 
capable of giving meaning and force to a constitutional mandate to provide a specific quality of 
education without intruding into legislative duties). 
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courts have simply resolved whether a state’s education funding scheme 
supplied a “thorough and efficient” school system without first examining 
their power to do so.256 
Comparably sweeping if not amorphous mandates of educational 
quality have also been ruled justiciable.  The Montana Supreme Court was 
not deterred by the task of gauging whether the legislature had met its 
obligation to provide a “basic system of free quality public . . . schools.”257  
While conceding the legislature’s prerogative to define “quality” in the first 
instance, the court reserved the power to determine that the state’s funding 
system fell short of the constitutional requirement.258  A Kansas claim relied 
on provisions directing the legislature to “provide for intellectual, 
educational, vocational and scientific improvement” through public schools 
and to “make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of 
the state.”259  Though containing considerable verbiage, these directives do 
not afford the judiciary obvious means for determining whether the 
legislature has complied with its duties.  Nevertheless, the Kansas Supreme 
Court, examining several Baker factors, found each inapplicable to the 
case.260  State supreme courts have also brushed aside justiciability 
challenges to claims based on duties to provide “‘a thorough and uniform’ 
system” of public schools;261 to assure that all public school students receive 
“equal opportunities;”262 to maintain “a competent number of schools” or 
make “other provisions for the convenient instruction of youth;”263 to 
provide for “the maintenance, support and eligibility standards” of a free 
public school system in light of the state’s recognition of “the inherent value 
of education;”264 and to establish free public schools to “secure . . . the 
advantages and opportunities of education.”265  Other state supreme courts 
 
 256 See, e.g., Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 575 
A.2d 359, 412 (N.J. 1990). 
 257 Colum. Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 260 (Mont. 2005) (emphasis 
added) (quoting MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1). 
 258 Id. at 260, 262. 
 259 Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1219 (Kan. 2014) (quoting KAN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1–2). 
 260 Id. at 1219–29. 
 261 Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 372 (Colo. 2009) (en banc). 
 262 Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997) (quoting N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1)). 
 263 Brigham v. State, 889 A.2d 715, 717 n.2 (Vt. 2005) (quoting VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68); see also 
Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc., 81 So. 3d 465, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(asserting judicial enforceability of duty to provide a “uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high 
quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education” 
(quoting Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty. v. King, 940 So. 2d 593, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006))). 
 264 Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting TENN. CONST. 
art XI, § 12). 
 265 Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618, 623 (S.D. 2011) (quoting S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1). 
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have tacitly assumed justiciability by ruling on education clause claims like 
these.266 
For some courts, the bare requirement of a public school system has 
sufficed to imply standards for judging legislative compliance.  Thus, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court was prepared to infer substantive content from 
the constitutional command that the legislature implement “by appropriate 
legislation” the principle that “[t]here shall always be free public 
elementary and secondary schools.”267  The court rebutted at length the 
applicability of each of Baker’s factors.268  Indeed, the court specifically 
emphasized that that “[t]here are easily discoverable and manageable 
judicial standards for determining the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim[s].”269  
Four years later, the South Carolina Supreme Court was similarly 
dismissive of a justiciability challenge to a suit brought to enforce the 
constitution’s edict that the legislature “provide for the maintenance and 
support of a system of free public schools”: “Courts may experience 
difficulty in determining the precise parameters of constitutionally 
acceptable behavior; however, this imprecision does not necessarily signify 
that courts cannot determine when a party’s actions . . . fall outside the 
boundaries of such constitutional parameters.”270  In Arizona and 
Minnesota, courts measured state education finance schemes against the 
constitutional prescription of a “general and uniform” public school system 
without wrestling with the issue of jurisdiction.271 
B.  The Problem of Self-Execution 
The question of standards to enforce education clauses implicates an 
issue closely related to the political question doctrine: judicial treatment of 
 
 266 See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 505 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (“A general 
diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and 
liberties of the people, the general assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools . . . .” 
(quoting MO. CONST. art. XI, § 1(a))); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 589 (Wis. 1989) (“The 
legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly 
uniform as practicable . . . .” (quoting WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3)). 
 267 Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 211 (Conn. 2010) (quoting  
CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1). 
 268 Id. at 217. 
 269 Id. at 223 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Seymour v. Region One Bd. of Educ., 
803 A.2d 318, 325 (Conn. 2002)). 
 270 Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 160, 163 (S.C. 2014) (quoting S.C. CONST. art. 
XI, § 3) (assuming the requirement of “minimally adequate education”). 
 271 See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 808 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) 
(quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 308 (Minn. 1993). 
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non-self-executing clauses.272  The distinction between self-executing and 
non-self-executing constitutional provisions is articulated in Thomas 
Cooley’s classic treatise.  A provision is self-executing if it “supplies a 
sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and 
protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced,” whereas it is not self-
executing if it “merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by 
means of which those principles may be given the force of law.”273  Thus, a 
court’s perception that a provision conferring an affirmative right is non-self-
executing will often prompt the court to reject a suit seeking to enforce this 
right.274  This abstention may operate as the equivalent of nonjusticiability; a 
conspicuous example is a guarantee of a clean or healthy environment.275 
Conversely, the willingness of many state courts to view their education 
clauses as justiciable suggests an inclination to consider them self-executing 
as well.  The link between the two was reflected by the Texas Supreme 
Court’s decision in Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School 
District.276  There, the court emphatically rejected the notion that it was 
incapable of determining whether the legislature had made “‘suitable’ 
provision for an ‘efficient’ system” of public schools.277  Finding the 
question justiciable, the court declared the legislature’s duty “not 
committed unconditionally to the legislature’s discretion, but instead is  
accompanied by standards.”278  In subsequent discussion, the court 
separately addressed the issue of whether the state’s education clause was 
non-self-executing and therefore unable to support the court’s 
jurisdiction.279  Unsurprisingly if not inevitably, the court concluded that 
the provision was “self-executing insofar as it prohibits any system that fails 
 
 272 See José L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-
Execution: A Political Question?, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 382–84 (1993). 
 273 THOMAS M. COOLEY, 1 A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 167–68 (Walter 
Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927). 
 274 See, e.g., Nielsen v. State, No. CV93 0529695S, 1994 WL 684743, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 
18, 1994) (“If a provision is nonself-executing then the question becomes, should the matter be 
decided by a non-elected member of the judiciary or should the issue be referred to the legislature 
whose members can be removed from office by the ballot box if the people determine their will is 
being thwarted.”); id. (dismissing as nonjusticiable suit to compel legislative action to comply with 
alleged constitutional mandate). 
 275 See Fernandez, supra note 272, at 343–45.  See generally Oliver A. Pollard, III, A Promise Unfulfilled: 
Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions and the Self-Execution Question, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES 
L. 351 (1986). 
 276 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005). 
 277 See id. at 776. 
 278 Id. (quoting Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989)). 
 279 See id. at 781–83. 
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to meet [the provision’s] standards.”280  
The significance of such threshold victories for plaintiffs, however, 
should not be overstated; even if an education clause is self-executing as 
well as justiciable, ultimate success is hardly assured.  On the contrary, of 
course, plaintiffs who establish justiciability may well be thwarted on the 
merits.  The aftermath of Neeley provides a telling example.  In the 
culmination of a suit that originated in the early 1970s,281 the Texas 
Supreme Court affirmed its authority to assess the constitutionality of the 
state’s education system282 while upholding that system against a variety of 
attacks.  The Connecticut Supreme Court similarly rejected a state 
constitutional challenge to the state’s public school system eight years after 
affirming the suit’s justiciability.283  Moreover, even plaintiffs who formally 
prevail may find their victory to be at best provisional.  In Rose v. Council for 
Better Education, Inc.,284 for example, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
promulgated criteria for the “efficient” system of public schools required by 
the state’s constitution285 and declared that the legislature had not met 
them.286  Rather than order a specific remedy, however, the court 
announced that it would be the responsibility of the legislature—“using its 
own judgment and exercising its own power and constitutional duty”—to 
establish an efficient system.287  The North Carolina Supreme Court 
similarly stated its duty to address an education clause claim288 then 
remanded the case with instructions to grant “every reasonable deference” 
to the state’s coordinate branches when weighing whether they had fulfilled 
their obligation to provide children with a sound education.289  Even when 
the court found violations of this obligation in a later case,290 it overturned 
the trial court’s remedial orders and remanded the suit “ultimately into the 
 
 280 Id. at 783; see also Colum. Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 260, 260–63 
(Mont. 2005) (holding that while the state constitution’s requirement of “quality” public education 
was non-self-executing and therefore nonjusticiable in the first instance, the absence of a 
legislative definition of “quality” authorized the court to rule that the funding system for schools 
violated the clause). 
 281 See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 752 n.6 (Tex. 1995) (Enoch, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 282 See Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 846–47 (Tex. 2016). 
 283 Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 176 A.3d 28, 49 (Conn. 2018). 
 284 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
 285 Id. at 212–13. 
 286 Id. at 189. 
 287 Id. at 203–04. 
 288 Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 253–54 (N.C. 1997). 
 289 Id. at 261. 
 290 Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 390–91 (N.C. 2004). 
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hands of the legislative and executive branches.”291  It seems conceivable 
that these courts and others, while asserting the prerogative to review 
education systems for compliance with their state’s education clause, harbor 
doubts about their capacity to actually enforce it.292 
To the extent that such hesitation exists, it may be driven largely by 
concerns over courts’ ability to upset legislatures’ budgetary decisions.  
Remedies for a violation of constitutional standards of quality, for example, 
could include major expenditures necessitating an increase in taxes, 
cutbacks in funding for other programs, or both.  The manner in which 
spending on education is allocated may also be thought to lie beyond 
judicial prerogative or competence.293  Perhaps the Nebraska Supreme 
Court had such considerations partly in mind when it “refuse[d] to wade 
into that Stygian swamp” of “continuous litigation and challenges 
to . . . school funding systems.”294  Moreover, judicial reluctance to 
overturn spending decisions about education exemplifies a broader desire 
to plunge into issues with implications for fiscal policy.  For example, state 
courts have dismissed as presenting political questions suits alleging the 
inadequacy of funds appropriated for a presidential preference primary295 
and for services required under the state’s mental health and intellectual 
disability law.296  Even a superficially precise mandate like a constitutional 
limit on state spending may confront a court with the impossible task of 
defining terms like “[g]eneral budget expenditure,” “increase in inflation,” 
and “increase in personal income.”297  While state courts do not 
categorically shy away from ruling on the propriety of public expenditures, 
 
 291 Id. at 397. 
 292 A notable exception has been the New Jersey Supreme Court’s approach to the state 
constitution’s requirement of a “thorough and efficient” public school system.  N.J. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 4, cl. 1; see, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842, 854 (N.J. 2002) [hereinafter 
Abbott VIII]; Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 425 (N.J. 1997) [hereinafter Abbott IV]; 
see also Joy Chia & Sarah A. Seo, Battle of the Branches: The Separation of Powers Doctrine in State 
Education Funding Suits, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125, 142–43 (2007) (reviewing series of 
rulings by New Jersey Supreme Court ordering changes in state’s public school system). 
 293 See Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 589. 
 294 Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy (Coal.) v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007). 
 295 See Beaufort Cty. v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 718 S.E.2d 432, 438 (S.C. 2011). 
 296 See Mental Health Ass’n v. Corbett, 54 A.3d 100, 105–06 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
 297 Nielsen v. State, No. CV93 0529695S, 1994 WL 684743, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1994) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Roger Sherman Liberty Ctr., Inc. v. Williams, 28 A.3d 
1026, 1035–36 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011) (deeming “general budget expenditures” in constitutional 
balanced budget provision to present political question).  For an argument that a proposed 
balanced budget amendment to the United States Constitution would be judicially unenforceable, 
see Gay Aynesworth Crosthwait, Article III Problems in Enforcing the Balanced Budget Amendment, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1065, 1105–07 (1983). 
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intervention is more likely to occur where the issue involves questions and 
language amenable to traditional judicial interpretation.298 
V.  DEFERENCE TO INTERNAL GOVERNANCE OF COORDINATE 
BRANCHES 
In Powell v. McCormack,299 the United States Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge by the House of Representatives to the Court’s authority to 
review the House’s refusal to seat Adam Clayton Powell.300  In contrast, 
state courts have broadly refrained from assessing the inner workings of 
coordinate political branches.  This restraint has been especially evident in 
courts’ ruling as nonjusticiable actions to invalidate legislative proceedings 
and to overturn elections. 
As might be expected, state courts have been profoundly wary of 
striking down laws on grounds of the allegedly unconstitutional process by 
which they were adopted.301  Thus, Maryland’s high court refused to 
entertain a claim that a statute was invalid because Senate passage occurred 
during a session not sanctioned by the state’s constitution.302  Such judicial 
intrusion into a legislative “internal procedural issue” would represent a 
“fail[ure] to respect a coordinate branch of government” and therefore 
rendered the claim nonjusticiable.303  The Alabama Supreme Court 
followed similar reasoning in dismissing a challenge to a law charging that 
it had not received the requisite votes for passage.  Because the legislature 
was entitled to rely upon “its own rules and procedures,” the validity of a 
statute enacted in this fashion was ruled a nonjusticiable political 
 
 298 See, e.g., Brewer v. Burns, 213 P.3d 671, 675–76 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc) (rejecting justiciability 
challenge to the governor’s petition for an order directing the legislature to immediately present 
final budget bills to the governor pursuant to a process prescribed by state constitution); 
Schabarum v. Cal. Legislature, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (ruling on the 
question of whether certain funds must be included in the legislative budget in an action alleging 
violation of a state constitutional spending cap); Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 
279, 287 (Haw. 2012) (permitting a suit alleging unconstitutionally insufficient spending on 
administrative and operating expenses for the state home lands department where the state 
constitutional convention set forth specific standards); see also Busse v. City of Golden, 73 P.3d 
660, 665–67 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (asserting judicial authority to resolve a claim that the city’s 
expenditures of bond proceeds were contrary to the purpose approved by voters). 
 299 395 U.S. 486 (1969).  
 300 See generally id.  For a further discussion of Powell, see supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 301 This philosophy represents a continuity with the period before 1985 earlier surveyed. See Stern, 
supra note 9, at 102. 
 302 Smigiel v. Franchot, 978 A.2d 687, 694–95, 701 (Md. 2009) (involving an Extraordinary Session 
held without constitutionally required approval by House).  
 303 Id. at 701. 
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question.304  This philosophy and outcome were echoed by the Vermont 
Supreme Court in a suit to overturn a law whose passage involved approval 
by legislators allegedly ineligible to vote on the bill.305  In New Hampshire, 
an attempt to challenge the constitutional validity of the method employed 
to enact a statute likewise foundered on the political question doctrine.  The 
claim was nonjusticiable, ruled the New Hampshire Supreme Court, 
because “[t]he authority to adopt procedural rules for passing legislation is 
demonstrably committed to the legislative branch.”306 
Nor are state courts inclined to review alleged legislative procedural 
irregularities even before they culminate in formal laws which courts are 
loath to upset.  For example, the Washington Supreme Court dismissed an 
action to compel the lieutenant governor, in his capacity as president of the 
Senate, to forward a Senate bill to the House of Representatives.307  The 
suit challenged the lieutenant governor’s parliamentary ruling that the bill’s 
passage required approval by two-thirds of the Senate rather than the 
simple majority it received.308  Declaring the dispute to present a political 
question, the court announced that it would “not interfere in the internal 
proceedings of a legislative house to overturn a ruling on a point of order.”309  Applying 
this philosophy, the Mississippi Supreme Court recently refused to grant an 
 
 304 Jefferson Cty. Comm’n v. Edwards, 32 So. 3d 572, 584 (Ala. 2009) (involving a dispute over the 
proper calculation of a two-thirds vote required for the enactment of a bill in a special session); see 
also Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 221 (Ala. 
2005) (ruling that the question of whether statutes were unconstitutional because they were 
enacted without a constitutionally required majority was nonjusticiable). 
 305 See Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d 428, 431 (Vt. 2001) (denying to resolve a suit concerning plaintiffs 
seeking disqualification of House members who allegedly participated in a betting pool over 
prospects of an earlier vote on a bill). 
 306 Sumner v. N.H. Sec’y of State, 136 A.3d 101, 106 (N.H. 2016) (quoting Baines v. N.H. Senate 
President, 876 A.2d 768, 776 (N.H. 2005)); see also Starr v. Governor, 910 A.2d 1247, 1249–52 
(N.H. 2006) (rejecting as nonjusticiable a challenge to law based on the legislature’s alleged 
procedural impropriety on the ground that “the legislature, alone, has complete control and 
discretion whether it shall observe, enforce, waive, suspend, or disregard its own rules of 
procedure”); Baines, 876 A.2d at 775–77 (holding nonjusticiable a claim that law was enacted in 
violation of statutory procedures for passing legislation because the state constitution “grants the 
legislature the authority to establish such procedures”); Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Hickok, 762 A.2d 
398, 412–17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (applying Baker factors for determining a political question in 
declining to review a claim that the legislature employed a constitutionally forbidden process in 
enacting law); Dintzis v. Hayden, 606 A.2d 660, 662 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (deeming 
nonjusticiable a claim that a representative violated House rules through means of recording a vote 
supporting challenged law); Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 773–74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) 
(refusing to void bills that were allegedly products of prohibited, secret legislative meetings on the 
ground, inter alia, that the question of when to close sessions was “a purely political question”). 
 307 See generally Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310 (Wash. 2009) (en banc). 
 308 See id. at 314–16. 
 309 Id. at 317–18. 
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injunction to bar the Speaker of the House of Representatives from using a 
high-speed electronic reading device for legislative bills in alleged violation 
of the constitutional requirement that “every bill shall be read in full 
immediately before the vote on its final passage upon the demand of any 
member.”310  According to the plaintiff, this method rendered the bills 
incomprehensible and thus violated the constitutional requirement that 
“every bill shall be read in full immediately before the vote on its final 
passage” upon a member’s demand.311  For the court, the requested order 
was barred by the political question doctrine because it sought to “involve 
the judiciary in legislative procedural matters.”312  The Kentucky Supreme 
Court similarly rebuffed a suit charging Senate violation of a constitutional 
provision allowing “any member” to call up a bill that a committee “refuses 
or fails to report . . . in a reasonable time.”313  Under Senate rules, 
effectuation of this procedure required that a majority of senators agree 
that the bill had been held an unreasonable time.314  Despite the surface 
clash between the constitutional prerogative conferred on “any member” 
and the Senate rule’s far higher threshold, the court deferred to the 
Senate’s disposition of the question.  Just as the United States Supreme 
Court had deemed a political question what constitutes a reasonable time 
for ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment, so the Kentucky 
Senate had plenary discretion to determine what qualifies as a “reasonable 
time” for a committee to submit proposed legislation.315  Other courts, too, 
have dismissed as nonjusticiable suits inviting them to intervene in the way 
the legislature conducts business.316 
 
 310 Gunn v. Hughes, 210 So. 3d 969, 970 (Miss. 2017) (quoting MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 59). 
 311 Id.  
 312 Id. at 973–74. 
 313 Philpot v. Haviland, 880 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Ky. 1994) (quoting KY. CONST. § 46). 
 314 Id. 
 315 See id. at 553–54 (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453–54 (1939)).  For a discussion of 
Coleman, see supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
 316 See, e.g., Progress Mo., Inc. v. Mo. Senate, 494 S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (dismissing a 
claim that the Missouri Senate’s restriction on recording committee meetings violated state 
sunshine law); Hughes v. Speaker of N.H. House of Representatives, 876 A.2d 736, 744 (N.H. 
2005) (“Statutes relating to the internal proceedings of the legislature ‘are not binding upon the 
Houses. . . .  Either branch . . . is free to disregard or supersede such statutes by unicameral 
action. ’” (first omission in original) (internal citation omitted)); In re Judicial Conduct Comm., 751 
A.2d 514, 516–17 (N.H. 2000) (per curiam) (designating as a political question an issue 
concerning the manner in which witnesses are deposed in a legislative committee’s investigation 
into possible impeachment of a judge); Blackwell v. City of Philadelphia, 684 A.2d 1068, 1071 
(Pa. 1996) (“Under the political question doctrine, courts generally refuse to scrutinize a 
legislature’s choice of, or compliance with, internal rules and procedures.”); S.C. Pub. Interest 
Found. v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm’n, 632 S.E.2d 277, 279–80 (S.C. 2006) (dismissing as a 
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Admittedly, state courts have occasionally reviewed the propriety of 
legislatures’ procedures, but these rulings reflect no fundamental impulse to 
encroach on legislative prerogatives of self-governance.  In a Pennsylvania 
case, several citizen groups were allowed to press their claim that certain 
transportation laws were enacted through means that violated provisions of 
the state’s constitution.317  However, the opinion could hardly be described 
as a judicial invasion of legislative procedures.  First, the constitutional 
provisions at issue appeared to lend themselves to straightforward 
interpretation rather than second-guessing legislative judgment.318  
Moreover, the court took pains to affirm that the legislature “has exclusive 
power over its internal affairs and proceedings.”319  Finally, while analyzing 
the petitioners’ claims under eight separate provisions of the constitution, 
the court ultimately dismissed each of them for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted.320  In Michigan, a court found justiciable the 
issue of whether a legislative committee’s prohibition on videotaping its 
meeting violated state law and even adjudged the ban a violation.321  
Nevertheless, the result represented an exceedingly modest victory for 
judicial supervision of legislative proceedings.  The court ruled the 
committee’s chair immune from liability,322 refused to grant the plaintiffs 
the injunction they sought barring future violations,323 and emphasized that 
the plaintiffs “did not seek to enforce or interpret any legislatively 
 
political question the issue of whether a legislatively established body followed the proper process 
in determining that a candidate for judicial office was qualified); see also Hussey v. Say, 384 P.3d 
1282, 1288–89 (Haw. 2016) (deeming nonjusticiable a suit alleging that legislator did not meet 
state constitutional residency requirement). 
 317 See generally Common Cause/Pa. v. Commonwealth, 710 A.2d 108 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998), aff’d, 
757 A.2d 367 (Pa. 2000). 
 318 Id. at 113 n.7 (“No amendment to bills by one House shall be concurred in by the other, except 
by the vote of a majority of the members elected thereto, taken by yeas and nays, and the names 
of those voting for and against recorded upon the journal thereof, and reports of committees of 
conference shall be adopted in either House only by the vote of a majority of the members elected 
thereto, taken by yeas and nays, and the names of those voting recorded upon the journals.” 
(quoting PA. CONST. art. III, § 5)). 
 319 Id. at 118. 
 320 Id. at 119–23; see also Magee v. Boyd, 175 So. 3d 79, 104–15 (Ala. 2015) (asserting the 
justiciability of a claim that the procedure by which a bill was enacted as law violated the state 
constitution but concluding that the procedure was valid); Pa. AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 691 
A.2d 1023, 1033 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (allowing a claim that a legislative process used to enact 
a bill did not conform to constitutional requirements but holding that the process did not amount 
to a violation), aff’d on other grounds, 757 A.2d 917 (Pa. 2000). 
 321 Wilkins v. Gagliardi,  556 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
 322 Id. at 176–79. 
 323 Id. at 180. 
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determined rules of the House.”324 
Other cases of judicial review of internal legislative rules have involved 
special circumstances that did not detract from courts’ general 
unwillingness to enter that thicket.  In one, the defendant legislator 
unsuccessfully invoked the political question doctrine as a shield against his 
prosecution for violating a legislative rule that distinguished between 
legislative and political activity.325  Whatever the potential for ambiguity in 
other contexts, the court found the rule’s unambiguous application to the 
legislator’s alleged conduct a sufficient basis for prosecution.326    
Additionally, a New York case implicated the familiar principle of 
heightened judicial willingness to intervene where the challenged conduct 
appears to undermine the political process itself.327  There, members of the 
minority party in the legislature challenged internal rules that allocated 
funds in a manner that favored political interests of the majority party.328  
While acknowledging the judiciary’s “reluctan[ce] to intervene in intra-
branch disputes,” the court rejected the defendants’ political question 
defense because the challenged practices allegedly impaired the plaintiffs’ 
ability to adequately represent their constituents.329 
Moreover, state courts’ responses to suits to overturn executive 
processes—though such actions are apparently fewer—display the same 
 
 324 Id. at 176. 
 325 See State v. Chvala, 678 N.W.2d 880 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004); accord State v. Jensen, 681 N.W.2d 
230, 253 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004); see also People v. Norman, 789 N.Y.S.2d 613, 622–23 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2004) (upholding prosecution of a state legislator for allegedly filing false travel expenses and 
rejecting defense that a determination of propriety of obtaining payments at issue was a political 
question); Hamilton v. Hennessey, 783 A.2d 852, 856, 859–60 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (finding 
justiciable an action against an incumbent legislative candidate for failure to report as campaign 
expenses the cost of alleged “political advertisements” as required by statute (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 326 See generally Chvala, 678 N.W.2d 880. 
 327 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[L]egislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation [may] be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.”); JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105 (1980) (calling 
on courts to interpret a constitutional principle that requires “[c]learing the [c]hannels of 
[p]olitical [c]hange”); David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1251, 1268 (“The Carolene Products footnote . . . [directs that] the political process must stay open, 
and it is the courts’ job to keep it open.”). 
 328 See Urban Justice Ctr. v. Pataki, 810 N.Y.S.2d 826, 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 828 N.Y.S.2d 
12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 329 Id. at 836; cf. Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 404–05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (ruling justiciable an 
action alleging that the Secretary of State’s certification of certain voting machines violated 
Arizona’s Constitution and statutes). 
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underlying restraint seen in the legislative setting.  Thus, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court refused to overturn a pardon issued by the governor for 
failure to comply with a constitutional publication requirement.330  Despite 
apparently acknowledging the violation,331 the court based its decision on 
the principle that “compliance with constitutional provisions that are 
procedural in nature and committed solely to another branch of 
government is not justiciable.”332  This philosophy has been perhaps most 
notable where the executive conduct in question impinged on the judiciary 
itself.  In one instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed an equal 
protection claim against the governor for alleged racial discrimination in his 
selection of nominees to that court.333  Such interference with judicial 
appointments, the court held, would violate the first two prongs of the Baker 
test.334  It is true that as with suits challenging legislative proceedings, no 
rigid rule categorically bars state courts from reviewing executive 
procedures.  Still, as in that arena, plaintiffs who establish justiciability seem 
unlikely to replicate their success on the merits.335 
VI.  THE TRANSCENDENT PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
As is evident just from cases noted in this Article, the political question 
doctrine has served as a buffer to constitutional claims with much more 
frequency in state than in federal courts.  This disparity, however, does not 
reflect a deferential conception by state judiciaries of their role.  Rather 
state judges, like their federal counterparts, invoke the political question 
doctrine as an incident of their function as definitive arbiter of 
constitutional law. 
 
 330 In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 414 (Miss. 2012). 
 331 See id. at 403 (“[T]he controlling issue is not whether Section 124 [of the Mississippi Constitution] 
requires applicants for pardons to publish notice—it clearly does.”). 
 332 Id. at 406. 
 333 Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm’n, 214 S.W.3d 419, 436 (Tenn. 2007). 
 334 Id. at 435–36; see also Loigman v. Trombadore, 550 A.2d 154, 157–59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1988) (rejecting as nonjusticiable a suit brought under the state constitution’s judicial 
appointments clause challenging the procedure by which the governor obtained 
recommendations from the state bar association). 
 335 See, e.g., Fuller v. Republican Cent. Comm., 120 A.3d 751, 759, 764 (Md. 2015) (authorizing an 
action to challenge the mode of submitting names to the governor to fill, and approve nominees 
for, vacancies in the legislature); News & Observer Publ’g Co. v. Easley, 641 S.E.2d 698, 700 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2007) (permitting a suit to compel records of clemency applications but affirming the 
governor’s authority to withhold records).  See generally Nielsen v. Kezer, 652 A.2d 1013 (Conn. 
1995) (rejecting a political question defense in a suit to compel the Secretary of State to place 
plaintiff’s name on a ballot as a political party candidate but upholding the exclusion of plaintiff). 
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As discussed earlier, the United States Supreme Court has invoked the 
political question to abstain from resolving constitutional issues only rarely 
in the decades since promulgating its standard in Baker v. Carr.336  
Conversely, the Court when rejecting the political question defense has 
emphasized that “it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution.”337  Indeed, the Court’s unwillingness to 
assign to other branches responsibility for resolving certain constitutional 
issues has drawn charges of judicial aggrandizement.  Criticizing the 
Court’s near-monopoly on constitutional construction, Rachel Barkow has 
objected to the view that “all constitutional questions are matters for 
independent judicial interpretation and that Congress has no special 
institutional advantage in answering aspects of particular questions.”338 
Whatever the merits of this critique, its assessment of judicial primacy 
may even be understated.  For it is not only when deciding a substantive 
issue that the Court exerts its power, but also when making the threshold 
determination of justiciability vel non.  As the Court recognized in Baker, 
“[d]eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government . . . is itself a delicate 
exercise in constitutional interpretation.”339  The assertion of judicial 
prerogative thus occurs even when the Court decides—however 
infrequently—that an issue presents a political question.  If a coordinate 
branch is occasionally authorized to resolve a constitutional question, it is 
only by leave of the Court. In this sense, “the modern political question 
doctrine is a species of—not a limitation on—judicial supremacy.”340  A 
similar analysis can be—and has been—applied to the doctrine’s operation 
in state courts.341  
Moreover, while state courts may find constitutional issues to present 
political questions more often than the Supreme Court, they also have 
more occasion to do so.  In particular, the susceptibility of positive rights 
claims to political question challenges arises only in the state context.342  
 
 336 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see supra Part I-A(2)(3). 
 337 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211). 
 338 See Barkow, supra note 89, at 302. 
 339 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
 340 Grove, supra note 24, at 1915. 
 341 See Stern, supra note 9, at 412 (“[I]n classifying electoral disputes as ‘political questions,’ state 
courts are not assuming a posture of passive deference to the political branches.  Rather, judicial 
detachment in this context represents the state courts’ reaffirmation of their preeminent role as 
guardian of the strict boundaries that state constitutions have erected between the branches of 
government.”). 
 342 See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
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These exceptional instances, however, should not obscure the widespread 
powerful presumption of justiciability among the states’ judiciary.  A 
Pennsylvania court captured this principle: “The political question doctrine 
should not be invoked . . . unless it is clear that a court is incapable of 
rendering a decision because it would otherwise be plainly inconsistent with 
Marbury v. Madison’s basic assumption that the Constitution is judicially 
declarable law.”343  The prevalence of this philosophy is evidenced by the 
frequency with which state courts reject claims of political questions by 
reciting Marbury’s classic maxim that “[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”344  Applying 
essentially the same reasoning, other courts have invoked Marbury while 
restating the principle of its most famous passage.345  Even when not 
explicitly citing Marbury, numerous state courts when dismissing the 
political question defense have asserted the judiciary’s preeminent place in 
constitutional construction in terms reminiscent of the case.346 
 
 343 Elliot v. Cruz, 137 A.3d 646, 650 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016). 
 344 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see, e.g., Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n v. Brewer, 275 P.3d 1267, 1275 (Ariz. 2012); Forty-Seventh Legislature v. Napolitano, 
143 P.3d 1023, 1026 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc); Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378 
(Colo. 1985) (en banc) (paraphrasing slightly the passage from Marbury); Office of the Governor v. 
Select Comm. of Inquiry, 858 A.2d 709, 730 (Conn. 2004); Makowski v. Governor, 852 N.W.2d 
61, 65 (Mich. 2014); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 163 (S.C. 2014). 
 345 See, e.g., Magee v. Boyd, 175 So. 3d 79, 105 (Ala. 2015) (“The legislature’s exclusive power over its 
internal rules does not give the legislature the right to usurp the function of the judiciary as 
ultimate interpreter of the Alabama Constitution.”); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 778 P.2d 757, 762 
(Idaho 1989); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997) (“Under the long-standing 
doctrine of judicial review, it is our sworn duty to determine whether the General Assembly has 
enacted legislation that is constitutional.”); William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 
A.3d 414, 418 (Pa. 2017) (“[I]t has been well-established that the separation of powers in our 
tripartite system of government typically depends upon judicial review to check acts or omissions 
by the other branches in derogation of constitutional requirements.”). 
 346 See, e.g., Schabarum v. Cal. Legislature, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] 
challenge to the constitutionality of an act is inherently a judicial rather than political question 
and neither the Legislature, the executive, nor both acting in concert can validate an 
unconstitutional act or deprive the courts of jurisdiction to decide questions of constitutionality.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Cal. Radioactive Materials Mgmt. Forum v. Dep’t of Health 
Servs., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)); Salera v. Caldwell, 375 P.3d 188, 201 
(Haw. 2016) (“This case . . . concerns . . . ‘constitutional interpretation’ . . . which is considered 
‘generally judicial fare.’” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Bd. of Educ. v. Waihee, 
768 P.2d 1279, 1285 (Haw. 1989) (“[T]he matter at hand [is] textual interpretation, which 
undoubtedly constitutes judicial fare . . . .”); Sarpy Cty. Farm Bureau v. Learning Cmty., 808 
N.W.2d 598, 607 (Neb. 2012) (“[W]e are specifically asked to determine whether the Legislature’s 
chosen means of implementing a particular policy violate specific provisions of the state 
Constitution.  This is a judicial function which this court is obligated to perform.”); Baines v. N.H. 
Senate President, 876 A.2d 768, 775 (N.H. 2005) (“It is our constitutional duty, however, to 
review whether laws passed by the legislature are constitutional. . . .  ‘We are the final arbiter of 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article makes no pretense to having revealed a massive upheaval 
in state courts’ approach to political question claims during the three-and-
a-half-decade period reviewed.  Yet, to dismiss the significance of the 
developments that have occurred is to ignore their broader context.  With 
the federal political question doctrine producing scant jurisprudence, state 
judiciaries are a forum in which courts’ capacity to resolve constitutional 
issues remains actively debated.  Their analysis of this fundamental issue is 
especially illuminating in addressing growing litigation over positive state 
constitutional rights like education.  The importance of such phenomena is 
reflected by a burgeoning body of scholarship subjecting state constitutional 
law to intense scrutiny.  If the landscape of the political question doctrine in 
state courts has not radically shifted, it still underscores the role and value 
of states as enclaves of exploration in our federal system. 
 
 
State constitutional disputes.’” (internal citation omitted)); Pa. AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 691 
A.2d 1023, 1033 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (“[T]he General Assembly [does not have] the right to 
usurp the judiciary’s function as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”); Turner v. Shumlin, 
163 A.3d 1173, 1181 (Vt. 2017) (“[C]ourts possess power to review either legislative or executive 
action that transgresses [the] identifiable textual limits [of the Constitution].” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993))). 
